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ABSTRACT 
HIGH-SPEED RAIL SAFETY ANALYSIS BASED ON 
DUAL-WEIGHTED COMPLEX NETWORK 
by 
Liu Lv 
This study uses a complex network model to analyze the causes of accidents in High-Speed 
Rail operations. By identifying the key factors that led to High-Speed Rail accidents, 
hidden safety hazards were discovered. This will help improve the operational safety of the 
U.S. High-Speed Rail line under construction. 
The analysis uses the regional High-Speed Rail network in Guangzhou, China as a 
case study, including the railway (including High-Speed Rail) accidents that occurred in 
the company's jurisdiction from 2013 to 2017. With comparative analysis between general 
railways and High-Speed Rail, the changes of High-Speed Rail safety factors are explored. 
Data analysis results show that the main accident causes of High-Speed Rail and general 
railways have no significant differences in categories, Equipment and human factors are 
the most important categories of factors leading to accidents. However, there are obvious 
differences in specific accident factors. Which include the significant impact of driver staff 
on the safety of High-Speed Rail, and the safety of High-Speed Rail is highly sensitive to 
incidents. Another key factor is the stability of the equipment, especially the performance 
of the signal system is critical to the operation of High-Speed Rail. The underlying reasons 
reflected by these safety defect factors include: 
1. In the short term, a large number of equipment purchases and the construction 
of new railway lines will cause maintenance, driver, and mechanic pressures 
and staff shortages. 
  
 
2. The weakness of the internal training system leads to insufficient professional 
quality of maintenance staff and driver. 
The proposed strategy includes enhancing the training organization within the 
operating company, and adjusting the High-Speed Rail construction and equipment 
procurement policies should be gentler in order to reduce the pressure on the system and 
improve the level of safety.  
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Safety is the most basic requirement of mankind, and ranks only second to physiological 
needs in Maslow's theory of needs. As a basic requirement of transportation in daily life, 
safety is not so easy to achieve: The statistics of the World Health Organization in 2016 
show (as shown in Table 1.1). Traffic (road) injuries rank 5th among the causes of human 





Table 1.1 Cause of Death Around Worldwide 




0 All Causes      2,668,476  100.0            35,761  
1 Ischaemic heart disease         203,700  7.6              2,730  
2 Stroke         137,941  5.2              1,849  
3 Lower respiratory infections         129,690  4.9              1,738  
4 Preterm birth complications         101,397  3.8              1,359  
5 Road injury            82,538  3.1              1,106  
6 Diarrhoeal diseases            81,743  3.1              1,095  
7 Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease            72,512  2.7                  972  
8 Diabetes mellitus            65,666  2.5                  880  
9 Birth asphyxia and birth trauma            63,928  2.4                  857  
10 Congenital anomalies            62,980  2.4                  844  
Source: WHO, 2016. 
 
Road accidents bring not only the loss of lives and families, but also huge economic 
losses. According to the estimates of the United Nations, the global property damage 
caused by road accidents is as high as 518 billion US dollars each year. Road traffic injury 
losses in EU countries are 180 billion euros per year, which is twice the annual budget for 
all activities in these countries (European Transport Safety Council, 2003). US road traffic 
injury losses are approximately US $ 230.6 billion per year, or 2.3% of GNP. Some studies 
in the 1990s estimated that road traffic injury losses in the UK were 0.5% of gross domestic 
product (GDP), Sweden was 0.9%, and Italy was 2.8%; 11 high-income countries had road 
traffic injury losses averaged 1.4% of GDP (Elvik R, 2002). In 1999, China ’s road traffic 
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injuries resulted in an estimated loss of US $ 12.5 billion, almost four times the country ’s 
annual health budget. (Zhou Y et al. 2003) 
It is the high and painful cost of traffic accidents that make safety research an 
eternal theme in transportation research. Countless talented scholars focus on traffic 
safety research, and the number of papers included in TRID alone exceeds 5,000 each 
year. Outside the university, NGOs and governments are driving improvements in traffic 
safety in various fields, including promoting the use of seat belts, controlling the use of 
illegal drugs or driving after alcohol, improving car safety, improving road signs, and 
recently starting to improve Problems with cell phone usage while driving. Countries 
’financial investment in traffic safety is also huge: Safety research throughout all 
transportation programs remains US DOT's number one priority. The Fixing America's 
Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act). providing estimated average annual funding of 
$ 2.3172 billion for Highway Safety Improvement Program for lase five years.(FHWA, 
2020) As a full-time federal agency responsible for highway safety in the United States, 
the National Highway Safety Administration NHTSA has a budget of 966.3 million US 
dollars (2019), The federal motor carrier safety administration FMCSA has a budget of 
666.8 million US dollars. The federal Railway Administration FRA's has a budget of 
221.7 million dollars. From 2004 to 2013, China invested 25.4 billion RMB in highway 
safety improvement, renovated 22,000 dangerous bridges, and spent 44 billion RMB. 
(Zhenglin Feng, 2013) Sweden proposed “Zero Vision” in 1997 (Trafikverket, 2015) 
extending the responsibility of road safety from road users to designers and engineers of 
road systems. Today, the vision expressed by “Zero Vision” to improve traffic safety 
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regardless of cost has been adopted by many countries. It is these joint efforts that make 
travel more and more safe. 
As another important mode of transportation, railway safety is also an area that 
transportation scholars cannot ignore. Despite the declining trend, railway transportation 
is still an important option of transportation, especially in Europe, India, China, and even 
parts of the United States. Even in the United States, railways still play an important role 
as commuting tools in local areas. NJ Transit, which operates in New Jersey, has 32% 
of its passengers, and about 140,000 people commute between New Jersey and New 
York City on the NJTRANSIT rail network on weekdays. (NJ Transit, 2019) The safety 
of the railway is related to millions of passengers and those high cost of infrastructure. 
As an emerging transportation mode, the emergence of High-Speed Rail has 
greatly improved the transportation efficiency and increased economic value of the 
railway network. Passengers move on the rails between cities at unprecedented speeds, 
which can reach three to four times the speed of the highway. In some regions, the 
emergence of High-Speed Rail as a market competitor has reduced the market share of 
aviation. The extension of railroad tracks, the expansion of the network, the surge in 
passengers, the significant reduction in travel time, but the hidden safety risks are also 
rising at the same time. Ten years after the September 11th incident, in 2011, the high-
speed developing High-Speed Rail in China encountered its own September 11th 
incident. The two high-speed trains collided due to the failure of the signal system. The 
accident killed 40 people and injured 200 people. The economic loss is estimated to be 
193,716,500 (RMB). (State Council of China, 2011) The pause button of China’s High-
Speed Rail construction has been pressed because of this accident, and also the operating 
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speed of entire High-Speed Rail national network has been reduced by 50km / h in the 
next few years. Subsequently, Spain and Taiwan had successive High-Speed Rail 
accidents in 2013 (Karl Penhaul, 2013) and 2018 (Taiwan Railways Administration, 
2019), the number of casualties exceeded 200. High-Speed Rail safety research is 
already an urgent need, and few articles have been published in academia. 
Accident research is an important step to improve safety. The investigator found 
the cause and process of the accident through post-event investigation and analysis, and 
explored the possibility of improving safety, hoping to avoid similar accidents in future 
operations. Statistics play an effective tool in exploring the law of accident occurrence. 
The time, place, trend, accident damage, and accident cause of the accident can be found 
in the statistics. But Railways, especially High-Speed Rail, are a technically complex 
transportation system. In modern socially complex railway systems, the cause of 
accidents cannot be isolated as single human error or technical function failure, but a 
mixture of personnel, technology, machinery, equipment, policies, management, and 
environmental factors. Therefore, statistical analysis in the traditional sense can no 
longer meet the needs of new situations. Various types of accidents propose models has 
been explored to explain the cause of the accident, and the most widely used model is 
called the system accident model. Recently, complex network model that has been born 
out of one of the branches of mathematics, "graph theory", has been applied to the 
analysis of accident causes after improved by scholars. The combination of the system 
accident model and the complex network model is to the great benefit for the in-depth 





1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Railway (especially High-Speed Rail) safety research has been ignored for a long time. 
Known research is focused on level-crossing, but it can also be seen as part of traffic safety. 
After all, car damage is more serious in this type of accident. The safety of the railway is 
much better than road since the total number of road accidents is far more than railway 
accidents. But compared to the “zero vision” plan for road safety, the number of deaths on 
the rails is unacceptable. The Figure 1.1 shows the number of railway accident deaths in 
China and UK. UK has 250 of deaths due to railway accidents each year. (RSSB, 2019) 
China's railway safety is improving year by year, but nearly 900 people still die from 





Figure 1.1 Statistics of railway deaths in China and U.K. 
Source: China State Railway Group Company, Ltd. 2011-2018. UK National Railway Administration, 
2011-2018. 
 
The content of the chart shows that although the number of railway accidents is 
small, it does not mean that railway safety can be ignored. However, due to its nature of 
public transportation, a single accident may have profound impact on human lives, 
environment, and passenger perceptions. Especially with the development of High-Speed 
Rail, high-speed brings not only the reduction of travel time, but also the dangerous 
magnification. Table 1.2 lists the traffic accidents that have occurred since the operation of 
the High-Speed Rail. it is necessary to analyze accidents associated with High-Speed Rail 
operations, identify causing factors and reduce and eliminate any damage, if possible. This 
is what every country that operates High-Speed Rail and countries that want to develop 
this technology should be concerned about, and also transportation Security researchers 

















Table 1.2 High-Speed Rail Accident Cases 
Year Location Accident Fatalities Injuries 
1998 German-Eschede Derailment 101 88 
2011 China-Wenzhou Collision 40 210 
2013 Spanish-Santiago de Compostela Derailment 79 140 
2015 French-Eckwersheim Derailment 11 42 
2018 China-Taiwan Derailment 18 215 
2018 Turkey-Ankara Collision 9 84 
 
The rapid development of  High-Speed Rail and the expanding network have led to 
an increasing number of stakeholders in safety research. As the latest development of 
railway technology, High-Speed Rail has become the mainstream development trend of the 
railway passenger transport market. Figure 1.2 summaries the High-Speed Rail develop 
plan around world. In continental Europe, the total length of High-Speed Rail in Spanish 
(ADIF, 2019) and France exceed 2500 kilometers, (Mengke Chen,2014) and the length of 
High-Speed Rail lines under planning / construction has reached thousands of kilometers. 
The United Kingdom is investing £ 56.6 billion in the construction of the High Speed 2 
High-Speed Rail line, with a maximum speed of 400 kilometers per hour. The High-Speed 
Rail in Turkey, Thailand and India are all planned and are already under construction. 
(UIC, 2019) In addition to the Acela rapid train system, the United States is also building 
the first 800-mile High-Speed Rail to connect San Francisco and Los Angeles with an 





Figure 1.2 High-Speed Rail development and planning development in countries around 
the world. 
 
In China, the country with the largest High-Speed Rail network in the world, more 
than half of the passenger capacity has been occupied by High-Speed Rail of the entire 
railway network. This shows the trend of China's High-Speed Rail mileage and passenger 
capacity from 2013 to 2018. (National Railway Administration, 2014-2019) The land on 
which thousands of kilometers of High-Speed Rail lines are located, fixed asset 
investments starting at tens of billions of dollars, are as safe stakeholders as the passengers 
on the train. Especially in the capital market, High-Speed Rail has become an important 
asset of listed companies. The Shinkansen of Japan completed the IPO as early as 1997. 
The Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail, China's busiest High-Speed Rail line, completed 
the IPO in 2019 with a market value of more than 300 billion (RMB) (Figure 1.3). The 
success of the IPO indicates that the value of the High-Speed Rail has been recognized by 










High Speed Rail in the World








Figure 1.3 Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail stock information. 
Source: Wall Street Journal, 2020. 
 
Although the development of High-Speed Rail is so rapid, the safety research 
around High-Speed Rail is still lacking. Some studies are directed at specific accidents, 
such as the 7.23 train collision accident in China, but there is little overall research on the 
safety characteristics of High-Speed Rail. In particular, there is no study comparing High-
Speed Rail with traditional railways. We need to know what are the unique characteristics 
of High-Speed Rail accidents compared to traditional railways, and where are more 
accidents occurring? Is it a station or a line? Bridge or tunnel? What happened to the cause 
of the accident? Which factor is more important, human factors and machinery? Are the 
traditional management and risk control mechanisms still effective? Does the traditional 
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maintenance policy need to be changed? These are the problems that researchers need to 
solve. 
China is a good case to study the safety characteristics of traditional railways and 
High-Speed Rail. China's High-Speed Rail developed later compared to Japan and 
Germany. In 2008, China's first real High-Speed Rail began to operate before the opening 
of the Olympic Games. Today China has built the largest High-Speed Rail network with 
more than 32,000 kilometers of tracks and transported more than 1.73 billion passengers 
yearly during the past decade. (Figure 1.4) As a widely accepted human feat, the High-
Speed Rail development has not only propelled China into the leadership position in 
railway transport but also state led technology transferring processes, not to mention the 
vast improvement to the travel conditions in China. At the same time, China also maintains 
the world's largest electrified railway network. There are 3.375 billion passengers per year, 
of which High-Speed Rail accounts for 2/3. As a large-scale network that has both 
conventional and High-Speed Rail, we can call it a hybrid network, and in a country with 
two modes of rapid transition, China can as an excellent case for observing the security 






Figure 1.4 China High-Speed Rail development chronology. 
Source: China State Railway Group Company, Ltd. 2019. 
 
Knowledge in academia also needs to be reviewed under new conditions. 
Traditional statistical methods, system control theory, and other qualitative and 
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analyzing the medical complex network theory in railway accidents, but they are all 
analyzing regular railway accidents and lack of High-Speed Rail accidents. Moreover, the 
degree of accident injury is not taken into account by the original theoretical analysis tools, 
which is also the potential for the theoretical development of research tools. 
 
1.3 Objective and Work Scope 
The objective of the study is to use High-Speed Rail accidents in China as a case study, use 
complex network models to study the main causes of High-Speed Rail accidents, discover 
the safety risks in High-Speed Rail operations, and hope to help to improve the safety of 
High-Speed Rail, those operating worldwide Under construction and planning. 
The scope of the study is mainly based on accidents in the Chinese railway network, 
and the geographical scope is limited to the three southern provinces: Guangdong, Hunan, 
and Hainan. The time frame of the accident is five years, 2013-2017. 
 
1.4 Organization 
The dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 emphasizes the importance of 
railway safety as background knowledge, and introduces the problems of railway (and 
High-Speed Rail) safety research. Chapter 2 summarizes the current research achievements 
of High-Speed Rail, especially safety research. The history of accident research and the 
application of complex network models in accident research are also introduced. Chapter 
3 introduces the dual-weighted complex network model. Chapter 4 explains the reasons 
why the case study chooses Chinese railways, and gives an overall description of the data 
collected. Chapter 5 records the establishment process of DWCN. Chapter 6 analyzes the 
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mathematical characteristics of the network. Chapter 7 discusses the major safety hazards 
of China Railways and High-Speed Rail. Chapter 8 summarizes the research results and 






This chapter reviews the literature on High-Speed Rail and safety research. The first part 
reviews the main achievements of High-Speed Rail research, and the second part reviews 
the development of traffic safety research theory and mainstream analysis models. Then 
the development of complex network model theory and its application in traffic safety 
research have been reviewed. 
 
2.1  Safety Research 
As stated by USDOT, Safety is the Department of Transportation ’s (DOT) highest priority. 
Similarly, security research is also the most important subject in academia. In the TRID 
database, more than 5000 articles about traffic safety are included every year. This figure 
only counts articles published in English. Research in the field of security has a long 
history, according to Zobair and KazuhikoAn (2017) who summarized the history of 
accident theory is classified into the following categories: 
1. Statistical analysis and trends 
2. Risk analysis 
3. Domino theory 
4. Epidemiologic theory 




2.1.1 Statistical Analysis and Trends 
Because of the nature of accident analysis, research is only possible after an accident has 
occurred. Data analysis, as the most basic scientific research method, exists throughout the 
history of accident research. From Vernon, who first applied statistical analysis to 
industrial accident analysis, to the latest complex network accident analysis model, 
statistical characteristics not only show the frequency of accidents under different time and 
space conditions, but also allow researchers to find out the occurrence of accidents depends 
on various factors such as internal and external factors (Vernon, 1918). 
2.1.2 Risk Analysis 
Through the development of statistical methods, Watson (1961) introduced the fault tree 
analysis (FTA) method to accident analysis. The so-called fault tree analysis method is to 
set certain risk control options (RCO) to quantify certain risk values. Through deductive 
analysis of known types of faults, understand how the system fails, determine the accident 
rate at different levels and find the best way to reduce risk. The emergence of fault tree 
analysis methods has made risk analysis popular in accident analysis. The main 
disadvantage of quantitative risk analysis is that it is impossible to predict how an accident 









2.1.3 Domino Theory 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Accident development process at Domino Theory. 
Source: Heinrich, 1931. 
 
Domino's metaphor is very visual and intuitively points out that the accident is not 
isolated, but the result of a series of events. Heinrich (1931) likened the process of accidents 
to five categories: ancestry and social environment, personal fault, unsafe act, accident and 
injury. Dominoes metaphorically describes the logical relationship between social 
environment and personal factors in an accident. The diagram at Figure 2.1 clearly shows 
this relationship.   
In the first version of this model, published in 1931, the five factors identified were: 
1. Domino 1: ancestry and the worker’s social environment, which impact the 
worker’s skills, beliefs and “traits of character”, and thus the way in which 
they perform tasks 
2. Domino 2: the worker’s carelessness or personal faults, which lead them to 





3. Domino 3: an unsafe act or a mechanical/physical hazard, such as a worker 
error (standing under suspended loads, starting machinery without 
warning…) or a technical equipment failure or insufficiently protected 
machinery 
4. Domino 4: the accident 
5. Domino 5: injuries or loss, the consequences of the accident 
 
Figure 2.2 Accident prevention method based on Domino Theory. 
Source: Heinrich, 1931. 
 
Domino theory also intuitively provides a way to organize accidents: cut off the 
event transmission chain, as shown in the Figure 2.2. 
The disadvantage of this model is that it is too simple for today's generally complex 
technology and organization to be a useful tool to help understand the cause of the accident. 
It uses a purely linear and mechanical model of causality, which is inappropriate in 
complex systems. In complex systems, accidents are usually caused by many interacting, 
partially competitive and unpredictable factors.  
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2.1.4 Epidemiologic Theory 
Epidemiological theory is designed to explain infectious diseases and the environment, but 
has been extended to accident research. The theory focuses on causality between 
environmental factors and accidents. The theory assumes that if accidents are public health 
problem, safety issues can be addressed in ways and techniques that have proven useful for 
large-scale disease problems. The theory is that the cause of the accident was found to exist 
in agents, hosts and the environment.  As show in the Figure 2.3. Haddon (1968) proposed 
a two-dimensional matrix in 1968 to determine the chronological order of hosts, pathogens, 
and environmental factors and to help determine preventive measures. (Table 2.1) The 
diagram shows the basic structure of the matrix: rows equivalent to the event phase and 
columns representing the epidemic triad of the host, pathogen, and environment. Pre-
accident and accident units are full of factors contributing to the accident or potential 
factors of the expected accident. Controls that help prevent similar incidents are described 
in the cells after the incident. The matrix provides a tool that can be used to motivate people 
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Source: Haddon, 1972. 
 
Figure 2.3  Relationship between host, agency and environment. 




2.1.5 Control and System Theoretic Models 
Control theory is mainly used in complex dynamic systems. Because the external input of 
the system is in an unstable state, the system needs to process the input by controlling 
internal variables, so that the system output is stable and in line with expectations.  
Since the Industrial Revolution, especially since the 1970s, the complexity of 
technology and organization has grown exponentially. Computers, CNC machine tools, 
and other large mechanical / electronic equipment have tens of thousands of parts. Large 
Stella organizations such as multinational companies have also reached the highest level 
of human knowledge in terms of business scope and geographical span. Taking into 
account the complex inside the system interactions (technical or organizational) and a large 
number of unavoidable accidents, Perrow (1984) proposed a term "normal accident" as a 
characteristic of the system.  
2.1.6 FRAM Model 
Through the study of complex systems, people began to think that failure and success have 
the same root cause. The functional resonance analysis method or FRAM (Hollnagel, 2004 
and 2012) provides a method to describe the results. This method uses the concept of 
resonance: Unstable and gradually increasing resonance of performance. FRAM analysis 
includes five basic steps: 
1. Identify and describe basic system functions. 
2. Check the model for completeness or consistency. 
3. Describe the potential variability of functions in the FRAM model. 
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4. Functional resonance is defined in terms of dependencies / couplings between 
functions and the possibility of mutation. 
5. Identify methods for monitoring resonance development to control system 
development. 
 
The spirit of FRAM is the following four basic principles: 
1. The Principle of Equivalence of Successes and Failures 
The theory believe that things go right and wrong in basically the same way. The 
fact that the outcomes are different does not mean that the underlying processes must be 
different. 
2. The Principle of Approximate Adjustments 
Many systems are complex, and the operating conditions will not always be stable 
in a state that perfectly meets the needs. Therefore, individuals and organizations usually 
adjust their performance to meet existing conditions. This adjustment makes performance 
and system conditions in a state of approximate adjustment, so the system will produce 
correct or wrong outputs. 
3. The Principle of Emergence 
The variability of normal performance is rarely enough to cause an accident, but 
the variability of different components may overlap in various ways leading to a sharp 
increase in non-linearity. Therefore, differences in system output cannot be predicted or 
explained by studying the performance of specific components. 
4. The Principle of Functional Resonance 
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The variability of one function is affected and enhanced by another function, 
which is called resonance in machinery. The existence of resonance can abnormally 
increase the variability of a function, and this increase is not a simple causal relationship 
or a linear superposition relationship. 
Overall, FRAM provides a comprehensive understanding of the system's work, 
emphasizing a more comprehensive perspective than previous research methods. But as 
a qualitative method, quantitative analysis cannot be performed, which is the 
disadvantage of this theory. 
2.1.7 STAMP Model 
The core of STAMP theory is the control and feedback loop composed of constraints. It 
believes that the occurrence of the accident is due to the loss of control (such as 
technology, engineering, management or organization, etc.) and the constraint failure in 




Figure 2.4 Control and feedback loop at STAMP Model. 
Source: Leveson, 2011. 
 
The basic concept of STAMP is to model the system structure, then identify the 
control and feedback loops related to safe operation, and then determine which controls 
and which constraints have failed to cause the accident, which means that the safe 
operation has lost control. As shown in the Figure 2.5, the control structure of STAMP 
is divided into two models at two levels, one for system development and one for 
operation. Constraints can be existing constraints (such as environmental or financial 




Figure 2.5 Two levels for STAMP Model. 
Source: Leveson, 2011. 
 
2.2 Complex Network Model 
Complex network theory is a new and vital theory. The foundation of a complex network 
is the network topology in mathematics. Topology is the mathematical nature of a network 
that does not depend on the location of nodes and the specific shape of edges. It also means 
that topology only focuses on whether there are edges connected between nodes in the 
network, and ignores the position of nodes and the length, shape, and whether edges 
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intersect with each other. Traditional mathematicians use the grid in Euclidean geometry 
to simulate the relationship of various factors in the system, and there are fixed connections 
between the nodes. 
2.2.1 Random Network 
The Erdős–Rényi model published in 1959 established the ER model. The model G (n, M) 
(Erdős and Rényi, 1959) or G (n, p) (Edgar Gilbert, 1959). The former indicates that n 
points and M edges form a network G, and the latter indicates that n points interact with 
each other with a probability of P. connection. The model simulates a random network 
structure, but the problem is that the connection probability of nodes in the actual network 
is not fixed. Moreover, the clustering coefficient in the ER model is low. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Different between regular and Random Network. 




2.2.2 Small World Network 
In 1998, Watts and Strogatz established a small-world model, which also has a smaller 
average shortest path length and a high clustering coefficient. In reality, many networks 
conform to the characteristics of the small world model. For example, the WWW network 
can be regarded as a small world network composed of computers (nodes) and network 
cables (edges) (Watts D J, 1998). Similar networks include electric power network 
(Faloutsos M, 1997), social relationship network (Hofman J M, 2017), transportation 
network (Preston, 2015), neural network (Huang, 2019), etc. 
 
Figure 2.7 Network sample for Small World Network. 
Source: Reka Albert, Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, 2002. 
Jon Kleinberg developed the W-S-K model based on the W-S model, and 
introduced the q coefficient (clustering exponent) to control the connection between nodes 
and the distance between nodes. The model is used to search for the shortest path, such as 




2.2.3 Scale Free Network 
Albert-László Barabási found that the degree distribution of the WWW network has a 
certain rule: as the degree increases, the probability of node degree is lower. In this regard, 
Barabási established the scale free model (Barabási, 2002), in which the degree of the 
network conforms to the power rate distribution. Epidemiology uses this theory to develop 
different immunization strategies. (Reuven Cohen, 2003) The scale free network actually 
provides a dynamic and complex network analysis method. Generally, the evolution of the 
network includes adding nodes, adding edges, reconnecting, reducing nodes, and reducing 
edges. Therefore, after considering the effect of time changes on the network structure, 
Krapivsky proposed a model to observe the changes of the network using the power 
exponent changes in the network. (P.L. Krapivsky, 2000)Albert and Barabási's second 
Scale Free network mechanism model (2000) considers three events: adding points, adding 
edges, and reconnecting. The research results show that both power rate distribution and 





Figure 2.8 Network sample for Scale Free Network. 
Source: Reka Albert, Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, 2002. 
 
2.2.4 Application 
Luo (2013) introduced the complex network model into the analysis of railway accidents. 
The original work is that the author provides a method to convert the railway accident into 
a network. As shown in the following figure, the levels include the organization (national 
level and local level), technology, staff and equipment of China's High-Speed Rail. The 
author analyzed the statistical characteristics of the network and found the key factors of 





Figure 2.9 Coding method for causation network. 




Figure 2.10 Coding method and undirected network based on “7.23 Railroad Accident”. 
Source: Luo, 2013. 
 
Compared to Luo, it uses an undirected network model, Liu established directed 
weighted accident causation network (DWACN) for the Rail Accident Investigation 
Branch (RAIB) in the UK, (Figure 2.10) which is based on complex network and using 
event chains of accidents. DWACN is composed of 109 nodes which denote causal factors 
and 260 directed weighted edges which represent complex interrelationships among 
factors. The statistical properties of directed weighted complex network are applied to 
reveal the critical factors, the key event chains and the important classes in DWACN. 
Analysis results demonstrate that DWACN has characteristics of small-world networks 
with short average path length and high weighted clustering coefficient, and display the 
properties of scale-free networks captured by that the cumulative degree distribution 
follows an exponential function. This modeling and analysis method can assist us to 
discover the latent rules of accidents and feature of faults propagation to reduce accidents. 
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This research is a further development of accident analysis methods using complex 
network. 
 
Figure 2.11 Directed causation network for accidents analytics. 





2.3 High-Speed Rail Study 
2.3.1 General Study 
Up to now, the research on High-Speed Rail has mainly focused on the economic field, 
such as the return on investment problem, competition with other travel modes, and the 
impact of High-Speed Rail on the regional economy. 
Return of investment (ROI) 
Return on investment is a concern of almost all countries and institutions, which is 
the key to the success of infrastructure. An important reason why most countries, including 
the United States, have not replaced traditional railways with High-Speed Rail is the high 
investment. According to the World Bank ’s research, the construction cost of High-Speed 
Rail per kilometer is as high as 145 million euros, even in China, which has the lowest cost, 
also reached 15.4-20.6 million US dollars per kilometer. (Osakar Herics, 2018) Risk 
analysis is necessary. For example, Thibaut LIMON, Yves CROZET, after evaluating 
different discount rates and risk factors in the evaluation of the South West High-Speed 
Rail project in France, the NPV value of the project changed from 735 million euros to -
1.298 billion euros. This means that the economic value of the project needs to be reviewed. 
The research of Liu and Lv provides the ROI data of China ’s first High-Speed Rail, 
according to the research. Liu and Lv studies the investment-return of Beijing-Tianjin 
High-Speed Rail, and adopts a systematic analysis approach, which made connections 
between life cycle costs, revenues and ridership. After testing a number of life cycle 
scenarios, the authors have developed ridership potential and associated fare policies. The 
analysis results show that investments in High-Speed Rail will receive adequate returns 
when the investment recovery period and life expectancy of High-Speed Rail are linked 
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and fare structures correspond to the demographic and social economic status of the 
travelers along the corridors. 
Both Christian and Liu's research provide examples of the country's support for the 
development of High-Speed Rail. In Italy, the government provides support through 
massive public funding and special regulations, while in China, government-led 
technology transfer and the state-owned economy dominate the development of High-
Speed Rail. This proves that safe and adequate financial support is the key to the success 
of the High-Speed Rail project. 
Economic Impact 
The economic impact of High-Speed Rail is mainly reflected in the tourism and 
aviation industries. Thanks to the European Structure and Investment Fund (ESIF), Spain 
has the world's second-highest railway construction plan after China. Even after 
experiencing its worst High-Speed Rail accident in 2014, Spain still plans to expand its 
High-Speed Rail network to 10,000 kilometers by 2020. It is the economic growth and the 
movement of people brought by High-Speed Rail driving the construction of Spain's High-
Speed Rail network. Spain ’s tourism industry accounts for 16% of GDP. The impact of 
High-Speed Rail on tourism has attracted the attention of many scholars. B. Guirao take 
Spanish case study try to figure out the High-Speed Rail impact for tourism, author analysis 
13 province via econometric model. For domestic travelers, the only provinces where there 
seems to be a relation between High-Speed Rail and the number of tourists is Guadalajara 
and Cuenca. The reason of few article is that there is only one data resource which from 
hotel, that maybe misleading the research finding: the main advantage for traveler take 
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High-Speed Rail is able to save money at overnight, that means part of travelers’ number 
may be missed. 
Francesca Pagliara developed a Revealed Preference survey at four famous tourist 
places at Madrid. Based on the survey data collected, authors calibrate two models via 
logistic regression approach to find out the relation between High-Speed Rail and tourists’ 
destination choices. Depends on some characteristics of the Madrid tourism market and 
Spanish High-Speed Rail lacking contact with EURO railway network, the influence of 
High-Speed Rail is especially reflected in international tourists.  
 
Table 2.2 High-Speed Rail Impact on Tourist Choice 
 




Table 2.2 shows the international tourists value aspects such as comfort and travel 
time reductions, and are generally less sensitive to ticket prices. The research has made it 
clear that other significant motivation for choosing High-Speed Rail is the possibility to 
visit nearby cities accessible by high-quality means of transport. 
High-Speed Rail also have an impact on the aviation industry. This impact is 
confined to the region, cross-border and long-distance routes are less affected. The impact 
of the aviation industry also includes lower fares and fewer flight frequencies. The 
advantage is that the High-Speed Rail can also help the airline's network to cover more 
fringe markets. Wenyi Xia and Anming Zhang conducted a deeper study of the connecting 
market and found that the cooperation between High-Speed Rail and airlines increased the 
connecting market fare. Angela Stefania Bergantino, Leonardo Madio studied the impact 
of socio-economic factors on travelers ’choices between High-Speed Rail and aviation 
based on data from Italy, and found that High-Speed Rail customers increase with age, 
income, and education. And passengers for business travel are more inclined to take the 
High-Speed Rail. 
2.3.2 High-Speed Rail Safety 
In the railway safety research field, plenty of works have been published which can be 
divided into two aspects: causation modeling, and accident prediction. For example, Dong 
and Wan (2013) propose an accident causation model to examine the presence of 
significant correlations, and they find interesting relationships among accident causal 
factors. Baysari et al. (2008) adopt the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS) framework to identify errors associated with rail accidents/ incidents in Australia. 
Ouyang et al. (2010) employ the Systems-Theoretical Accident Model and Processes 
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(STAMP) analysis technique to model the China–Jiaoji railway accident, and to discuss 
the accident spreading processes. Particularly, studies are carried out to evaluate the human 
factor in emergency situations during the Ladbroke Grove railroad accident (Stanton and 
Baber, 2008; Stanton and Walker, 2011). These studies also discuss how a driver passing 
a signal at danger would cause the Ladbroke Grove rail disaster. Here the root causal factor 
is the driver passing a signal, which is considered as a human factor. Oh et al. (2006) use 
various statistical models to examine the relationships between crossing accidents and 
features of crossings. Depending on the data of American Railway Safety Annual Report 
in 2005, Wang et al. (2009) build a railway accident prediction model with gray theory to 
predict the accident occurrence. 
TRID is the largest database that combines the records from TRB's Transportation 
Research Information Services (TRIS) Database and the OECD's Joint Transport Research 
Centre's International Transport Research Documentation (ITRD) Database. Currently, 
TRID is able to provide research scholars in the field of transportation with more than 1.25 
worldwide Millions of documents. However, only a very small amount of literature on 
High-Speed Rail safety research is currently available in the TRID database. The very 
limited literature focuses on the areas of mechanical design, Power System and traditional 
railway safety analysis: grade crossing. 
Mechanical Safety 
René Heyder, Gregor Girsch, studied different rail materials for rolling contact. The 
resistance of fatigue (RCF) has verified that head hardened rails have a better resistance 
against RCF defects than rails with as-rolled hardness. High-speed trains have extremely 
high requirements for the ballast of the railway track. The traditional ballast will cause the 
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ballast to be dislocated when passing through the high-speed train, affecting safety. Jieyi 
Deng developed the Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) model for evaluating the risk of 
flying ballast on High-Speed Rail. China, Japan and Germany have developed ballast less 
tracks for High-Speed Rail construction, providing better safety. Another focus is the 
impact of the environment on High-Speed Rail. Ma studied the fatigue crack growth and 
damage characteristics of High-Speed Rail rails under low temperature conditions. Xin 
Zhao's cracks on the rails are also low temperature. The damage to the rails deepens as the 
temperature decreases, and the form changes. Chongyi Chang et al. studied the wheel-rail 
adhesion of High-Speed Rail, and studied the changes of wheel-rail adhesion under 
different speed and temperature conditions, which is conducive to the design and 
improvement of train anti-skid control device. Ignacio Villalba Sanchis predicts that the 
probability of the occurrence of buckling events on the rails of the Spanish High-Speed 
Rail network will increase greatly in the context of global climate change. Liu conducted 
a similar study on wheel-rail contact and found that water has a positive effect on increasing 
the friction between the train wheel and the track. 
Power System Safety 
The most vulnerable part of the High-Speed Rail is the catenary system, which is 
easily damaged due to long-term exposure to air and the formation of complex electronic 
components. Xiao Wu developed an image recognition tool to detect the bird nest on the 
catenary system to eliminate the threat to train operation. He summarized the safety risk 
assessment research of the entire power supply system including catenary system. The 
article introduces the risk sources of the power supply system, including equipment 
performance degradation, environmental risks, and improper maintenance and repairs. 
 
39 
Grade Crossing Safety 
The main areas that Federal Railroad Administration declared to enhance railway 
safety include: 
1. Positive Train Control (PTC) Implementation 
2. Rail Grade Crossing and Trespassing Prevention outreach 
3. Human Factor / Workers Protection 
4. Administering funding for rail infrastructure upgrades across the nation 
5. Tank Cat Enhancements 
The traditional railway safety theme, "grade crossing safety" is still the theme of 
American railway safety during the period of developing High-Speed Rail. Samantha G. 
introduced the safety challenges encountered by grade crossing on High-Speed Rail lines. 
The study mainly summarizes the current technical means, management methods and 
safety education that need to adapt to the changes brought about by the High-Speed Rail. 
For example, signal lights and reminders will not adapt to the speed of high-speed trains 
and cause potential safety hazards. 
Accident Analysis  
Research on High-Speed Rail accidents is even more limited. The only article is 
found in the analysis of the cause of a single accident. Ziyan Luo analyzed the cause of the 
7.23 do EMU accident by establishing a causation network. In research, Luo regard the 





It can be concluded by reviewing the history of accident analysis theory that statistics is 
the most basic accident research method, and almost all accident analysis methods or 
models are based on statistics. The reason behind this fact is the importance of data in all 
analysis. Unfortunately, due to the lack of data, the current research on High-Speed Rail 
focuses on economic analysis and comparative analysis of various travel modes, and the 
research on safety topics is obviously insufficient. The only High-Speed Rail safety study 
is an analysis of isolated cases, and the results are not representative. 
Most of the mature analysis tools in security research belong to qualitative analysis. 
By abstracting the system and logically inferring it, finding key nodes of the system and 
exploring ways to maintain security / normal operation. Quantitative analysis tools are 
inadequate. Complex network models are still statistical analysis in nature, but by adding 
directionality and weight to the network, it reflects the logical relationship of accidents. 
In summary, the accident analysis of High-Speed Rail lacks macro analysis and 
research, and lacks a general description of the safety status of High-Speed Rail operations. 
The research on the difference between High-Speed Rail and regular railway accidents is 






The research method of this paper is to use the network theory in graph theory to simulate 
the accident cause network in railway accidents. Network theory has applications in many 
disciplines, and a large number of network structures also exist in the field of 
transportation. Even the first widely recognized proof of the "Seven Bridges Problem" in 
network theory can be regarded as a traffic problem. The transportation lines we are 
familiar with (roads, railways, subways and air lines) have formed a complex transportation 
network, which is also the most common form of network. Traffic in the network provides 
network direction and weighting characteristics. For example, in a traffic network, the 
traffic volume of different traffic lines will affect the importance of the line in the network, 
and the difference in traffic flow in different driving directions also determines the 
characteristics of different networks or lines. The various characteristics of the network 
precisely reflect the complexity of the real world. The benefits provided by abstract 
networks are not only concise but also computable. The mathematical characteristics of the 
network, such as clustering coefficient, betweenness centrality, etc., provide an effective 
tool for analyzing the characteristics of the network in reality. 
 
3.1 Overview 
The structure of the methodology shown in Figure 3.1, identify the code of the cause, and 
then determine the direction between the factors through the sequence of events in the 
accident. Through weighting, the second weighting takes into account the importance of 
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the event and the severity of the accident into the network to complete the network 
modeling. Calculate the mathematical characteristics of DWDN, including degree, 































3.2 Complex Network Concepts 
A complex network is a network structure composed of a huge number of nodes and edges 
connecting nodes. The mathematical definition of a complex network is a graph with a 
complex topology. Its structure is not completely regular or completely random. Figure 3.2 
shows a typical complex network. The picture shows the aviation network in North 
America. The countless routes (edges) in the figure are connected to countless airports 
(nodes). The complexity of the network cannot be described in simple language. The 
analysis of complex networks must also rely on mathematical tools. 
A directed weighted network G with N nodes can be represented mathematically 
by an N × N adjacency matrix A with elements. 
 
Figure 3.2 A conventional airline network in North America. 




In network theory, nodes are one of the basic units of the network. The node and the edge 
connecting the two nodes together form a network. Nodes can represent different concepts 
in different networks. For example, nodes in a bus network can represent bus stations; 
nodes in a computer network can represent computers or routers. In this article, the nodes 
in the accident causation network represent the single events that occurred in the accident. 
The mathematical features of node in the network are degree, weight, clustering 
coefficient, betweenness centrality, etc. 
3.2.2 Edge 
One of the basic units of the network, expressing the connection between two vertices. In 
an accident causation network, an edge indicates that there is a causal connection between 
two vertices (events). According to the directed nature of graphs, edges can be divided into 
two types: directed edges and undirected edges. 
The mathematical features of edges in the network are weight, path length, etc. 
 
3.3 Complex Network Features 
3.3.1 Degree 
One of the mathematical features of the node. The value of degree is equal to the number 
of all points connected by this node. It reflects the connectivity of vertices. The larger the 
value, the higher the connectivity. Note that the concept of degree does not consider the 
number of connections (strength) between two nodes. 
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As shown in Figure 3.3, the degrees of nodes A, B, C, and D are 2, 3, 1, and 4.  That 
is, 𝑘𝑘𝑎𝑎 = 2, 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 = 3, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = 1, 𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 = 4. 
 
Figure 3.3 Undirected network sample. 
 
In directed graphs, degrees are divided into in-degree and out-degree. In directed 
network (Figure 3.4) with almost the same structure as the above figure, the values of in-





Table 3.1 Degree Calculation Sample 
Node In-degree Out-degree All-degree 
A 0 2 2 
B 1 2 3 
C 1 0 1 
D 2 0 2 
 
 





The equations for degree are as follows: 
 




  (3.1) 
 
Where: 
i: node i in the network 
 j: any node except node i in the network  
 N: the number of nodes in the network 
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖: degree of node i 
 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: equal to 1, when the node i is connected to the node j, otherwise is 0 
 




  (3.2) 
 
Where  














 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: equal to 1, when the j node points to the i node and is connected, otherwise is 
0 
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  (3.5) 
 
Where 





One of the mathematical characteristics of a node, the value of strength is equal to the 
number of all edges connected by this node. Strength can evaluate the importance of nodes 
in the network. The larger the value, the higher the importance. Note that the difference 
between strength and degree is that if you calculate two nodes connected multiple times. 
Degree ignores duplicate connections, and strength counts them. Also taking Figure 3.3 as 
an example, the strengths of nodes A, B, C, and D are exactly the same, because the 
connection state of the points is completely the same.  
Same as degree, strength is also divided into in-strength and out-strength in the 
directed network. Similarly, because the network structure only adds directions, the in-
strength, out-strength, and all-strength of the four nodes are exactly the same as the in-
degree, out-degree, and all-degree values of node ABCD. 
The strength equations are as follows: 
 




  (3.6) 
 
Where: 
i: node i in the network 
 j: any node except node i in the network  
 N: is the number of nodes in the network 
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𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖: strength of node i 
 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: the weight of edge ij, which value equal to the number of connections from 
node i to node j 
 
 




  (3.7) 
 
Where  
 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: equal to the number of connections from node i to node j 
 




  (3.8) 
 
Where  




















  (3.9) 
 
Where 
P (s): refers to the sum of the probabilities that the strength is greater than or equal 
to s. 
3.3.3 Comparison of Degree and Strength 
The calculation formula of degree and strength is similar, but the mathematical meaning is 
quite different. The difference can be clearly distinguished from Figure 3.5. Compared with 
Figure 3.4, a directional connection is added between the two nodes B and D, which can 
be regarded as a simple weighting of Figure 3.4. Table 3.2 shows the value of degree and 
strength after directional and weighted. The values in brackets come from the unweighted 
network (Figure 3.4)  
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Table 3.2 Degree and Strength Comparison (sample) 
Node 
Direction-in Direction-out All 
degree strength degree strength degree strength 
A 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (2) 2 (2) 2 (2) 2 (2) 
B 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (2) 3 (3) 4 (3) 
C 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 1 (1) 
D 2 (2) 3 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (2) 3 (2) 
 
The difference is reflected in nodes B and D. (Table 3.2) It can be seen that the 
increased connection has no effect on the degree value, but obviously the network is 
strengthened between these two nodes, and the degree value remains unchanged and the 
connectivity of the entire network has not changed. Such a comparison helps to understand 




Figure 3.5 Directed network sample with weighted. 
 
3.3.4 Dual Weighted 
Double weighting means that while considering the strength of the network edge, the 
impact of the severity of the accident on the network structure is also considered. As 
mentioned above, railway traffic accidents are divided into four levels according to the 
time of casualties, property damage and traffic interruption. In the previous analysis 
methods and models, all attempts to use quantitative analysis methods for accidents are 
based on a unified standard to quantify the cause of the accident. model the accident, and 
then calculate the probability of the accident or the possible risk factors, the probability of 
causing an accident. For example, the causation network and complex network mentioned 
earlier. All causal factors are assigned a value of 1 (actually all factors in the model are 
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assigned a value of 1). These methods are conducive to simplify modeling and calculation, 
but the degree of danger that ignores the cause of the accident varies with the severity of 
the consequences of the accident. For example, in the complex network model, both EM24 
Signal Equipment failure and EM41 Train door detaching were assigned the same value 
“1”. However, EM24 caused the 7.23 accident and killed dozens of people, while EM41 
only caused a minor accident without any casualties. This is actually that the model is too 
simplified in the modeling process, ignores the severity of the accident, and will mislead 
the system to improve safety. Perhaps for isolated accidents, the difference in the influence 
of factors is not as obvious as in this example. But when the sample size of the accident 
case is large enough, the cumulative difference will be sufficient to affect the safety 
improvement work.  
Based on accident severity as shown in Table 3.3, the second weight details as 
follows: 





Level Ⅰ 2.0 
Level Ⅱ 1.8 
Level Ⅲ 1.6 
Level Ⅳ - A 1.4 
Level Ⅳ - B 1.3 
Level Ⅳ - C 1.1 






First, the factor d of the lowest-level general accident is determined, that is, the type D 
accident in level 4 is 1.0, and the upper limit of level 1 accident is 2.0. 
Secondly, due to C in general accidents (level 4) accidents, D accidents do not 
involve casualties and small property losses. Type C accidents are only slightly more 
severe than Type D accidents, so the factor d for Type C accidents is set to 1.1. 
Third, because the A and B accidents in the general accident (level 4) accidents 
involved casualties and more serious property losses, there was a clear difference from the 
C / D accidents, so there was a larger gap in weight, Set the factor d of the category B 
accident to 1.3. Accident A and accident B are both general accidents, and are higher than 
category B in various losses and injuries. Therefore, the factor d of the category A accident 
is set to 1.4. 
Finally, according to level 1, level 2 and level 3, the difference in loss is very 
obvious, so the factor d of level 2 and level 3 accidents is set to 1.8 and 1.6 respectively. 
3.3.5 (Shortest) Path Length 
The path between two points is also called graph geodesic. In an undirected graph, the 
distance between two points is the length of the shortest path between the two points. If 
there is no path between two points, that is, they are not connected, then their distance is 
defined as infinity. There is a possibility that there are multiple shortest paths between two 
points. 
In undirected graphs, the shortest path between two points is also directional, and 
the length of the shortest path in the two directions may not be equal. Note that there is a 
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case where the shortest path from node A to node B exists, and the shortest path from node 
B to A does not exist. 
The unweighted network defaults to a distance between two points of 1. Between 
two points in a weighted graph, that is, edges, can have their own lengths. The length of 
the edge is generally the weighted value of the edge. 
The equation is as follows: 
 
Shortest path length: 
 
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ℎ +∙∙∙ +𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖�  (3.10) 
 
Where  
L: the shortest path length 
i, h, j: three different nodes in the network 
3.3.6 Diameter / Radius / Average Path Length 
The diameter of a network is defined as the largest value among the shortest path lengths 
present in the network. 
The radius is defined as the smallest value of the shortest path length existing in 
the network. 
The average path length is the average of the shortest path present in the network 
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The equation is as follows: 
 
Average shortest path length: 
The weights need to be reversed first, so the calculation include two steps. 
 
Step 1      
 






�  (3.12) 
 
Step 2     
 





  (3.13) 
 
Where  
i, h, j: are three different nodes in the network 
𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖: average shortest path length 
3.3.7 Betweenness Centrality 
The concept of betweenness centrality is a measure of network centrality based on 
(shortest) path length. It is obtained by calculating the ratio of the number of paths passing 
through the node in all the shortest paths to the total number of all shortest paths in the 
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network. Betweenness centrality represents the degree of interaction between a node and 
other nodes, and also measures the importance of the node. The node with high 
betweenness centrality value is similar to a bridge on the river, and all cross-river traffic 
must pass through the bridge. The bridge acts like a central node in the city's transportation 
network. The importance of the bridge is expressed by the high value of betweenness 
centrality. 








  (3.14) 
 
Where  
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐵𝐵: the betweenness centrality of node h 
i, h, j: three different nodes in the network 
𝑚𝑚ℎ: the number shortest path with node h 
𝑚𝑚′: the total number of shortest path in the network N 
3.3.8 Clustering Coefficient 
In the network, if nodes A and B are connected and A and C are connected, then B and C 
are also likely to be connected, that is, your different friends may also be friends. The 
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clustering coefficient is used to describe the degree of clustering between nodes in a 
network. The aggregation coefficient can measure a network or a node in the network. 
The equation is as follows: 
 










  (3.15) 
 
Where  
𝑎𝑎′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 if 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 
𝑤𝑤′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖: degree of node i 
 



















4.1 Case Selection 
Case studies require that the research object has sufficient data, and it can represent the 
field of research, have rich connotations, and more importantly, have value and ability for 
future development. 
4.1.1 Country Selection 
Since the successful operation of the first commercial railway in Leeds, England, the 
railway has been developed in human society for more than two hundred years. Almost all 
countries in the world have this mode of transportation. It has been sixty years since the 
Japanese started construction of the High-Speed Rail. Over 20 countries in the world have 
operated High-Speed Rail with a total mileage of more than 50,000 kilometers. At the same 
time, there are only a handful of countries that have developed outstandingly in these two 
fields. Japan is one of the most developed countries in railway transportation and the 
birthplace of High-Speed Rail. However, Japan's railway operation system is too 
complicated. In addition to the seven large railway companies evolved from the "National 
Railways" JR Group, there are 16 medium-sized railway companies operating in the 
metropolitan area and many small railway companies. This fragmented business model has 
hindered research. France is an outstanding representative of the European High-Speed 
Rail, with the highest passenger volume and top High-Speed Rail manufacturers like 
Alstom. However, the French high-speed trains use a hybrid mode, and high-speed trains 
can run on both regular railway networks and High-Speed Rail. This hybrid networking 
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model makes it difficult to distinguish High-Speed Rail from traditional railways. The most 
direct impact is that the liability and loss of railway accidents are difficult to determine. 
The United States has the largest railway network in the world, but the passenger train 
business is shrinking year by year. And there is actually no real high-speed train running 
in the United States. The only Acela express train that meets the US DOT High-Speed Rail 
standard has an average operating speed of only 110 kilometers per hour. Britain is the 
hometown of railways, and has a sound railway management system and a professional 
accident analysis organization IRAB. However, the High-Speed Rail has only a 100-km 
line, and the data volume is too limited to support research.  
Comprehensive comparison of major countries can be found China is the most 
suitable case study of railway (High-Speed Rail) safety. China has the world's largest 
railway passenger transportation network, and the number of passengers on China's railway 
network is high every year. During the “Spring Festival” period of railway transportation, 
the number of passengers traveling by train was as high as 100 billion people, with an 
average of 500 million people every day. There are 3,000 EMUs driving on the rails every 
day. There are more than 5,000 trains. Far more than Japan, Europe, let alone the gradually 
shrinking North American railway network. 
China has the world's largest High-Speed Rail network. As mentioned earlier. 
China has built a 38,000-kilometer High-Speed Rail in just ten years, connecting all major 
metropolitan areas in China. The High-Speed Rail presents a multi-layer and multi-style 
network structure in China: 
The first, the north-south arterial route that runs through the country, such as the 
Beijing-Hong Kong High-Speed Rail, has a total length of 2260 kilometers and a speed of 
 
63 
350 kilometers per hour, connecting Beijing and Hong Kong. This is also the world ’s 
longest High-Speed Rail. 
The second, the High-Speed Rail along the river: a total length of 1900 kilometers 
and a speed of 350 kilometers per hour. A High-Speed Rail connecting the Yangtze River, 
the third longest river in the world, and all cities along the coast. Expanded Shanghai, the 
world's largest port is also China's economic center, economic hinterland to the Sichuan 
Basin. 
The third, in the Pearl River Delta region, the express passenger transport channel 
between cities has formed a High-Speed Rail network centered on Guangzhou and 
radiating to surrounding small cities, forming an inter-city express passenger transport 
network in the urban area. In a sense, it played the role of commuter railway. 
At last, the reconstructed fast railway. That is, after the original line is transformed, 
the operating speed reaches 200km / h or more. Although it is no longer classified as a 
High-Speed Rail according to China's latest official definition, it still meets the speed 
requirements of most countries in the world for High-Speed Rail. At present, this part of 
the railway has not yet achieved the separation of passengers and goods. 
In summary, the huge number of passengers, the rich types of routes, plus the 
diverse geographical characteristics of China. This allows China's High-Speed Rail 
network to meet any analysis needs. 
Of course, China is not a perfect case for research. The difficulty lies not in the lack 
of data but how to obtain it. There is a complete accident handling and information 
collection system in China, which is called the Ministry of Emergency Management of the 
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People ’s Republic of China (State Administration of Work Safety before 2018) at the 
national level.  After the accident, the emergency management department reports it to 
local institutions at various levels. This is the only data most people see publicly. The 
annual report is published around April of each year, and the specific disclosure time may 
be advanced or delayed by about a month in different years. The information contained in 
the annual report is very limited. The data related to accidents are only the number of 
deaths, the number of particularly serious accidents and an indicator that links the traffic 
volume with the number of deaths: a death rate of 1 billion tons kilometers. Only a vague 
shadow can be obtained through the report, so the quantity and quality of the data are the 
only factors that restrict the research. 
4.1.2 Operation and Accident Management in China 
There are three levels in the current railway management systems: China Railway 
Corporation as the top level, the regional railway company as the middle tier and the 
segment or section as the third, or operating units of actual railway lines and stations. There 
are 18 railway companies, each with route segment and a local joint venture railway 
company. As independent legal entities, the regional railway companies operate all the 
railway services in its territories and their financial information are tallied independently. 
There are sub-bureaus in major cities, which are responsible for the daily supervision and 
management of railway operations and report to the regional railway companies. 
Similar to the definitions used in the US, railway accident is defined as collision, 
derailment, fire, explosion, act of God, or other event involving the operation of on-track 




As documented in Table 4.1, railway accidents in China are generally placed in one 
of the four categories according to “Rules for Railway Traffic Accident Investigation and 
Handling”. The rail specific rules were developed by the Ministry of Railways in 
accordance with the “Regulations on Emergency Rescue and Investigation of Railway 
Traffic Accidents” formulated by the State Council of China. The placements are largely 
based on five different parameters: fatality, injury, property damage, derailment and delays. 
It is noted that the number of carts derailed for passenger and freight is different, which is 
logic as freight trains are generally longer and damages are assessed very different when 
human lives are involved, such as the case in passenger trains. Similarly, the operation 
stoppage or delay is generally measured by the number of hours the railroad is out of 
service and the delays along mainline operations are rated much higher than that of minor 





















I >30 >100 >￥100 
>18 (P) or 
    >60 (F) 
>48 
II 10-29 50-99 ￥50 -100 
2-17 (P) or 
    6-59 (F） 
>24 (mainline) or   
>48 (Minor) 
III 3-9 10-49 ￥10 -50 
2-17 （P） 
6-59（F） 
>6 (Main) or  
>10 (Minor) 
IV <3 <10 <￥10 Other specific conditions 
Source: State Council of China, 2008. 
 
There are four sub-categories: A, B, C and D, under the Level IV classification, 
which correspond to conditions that are more specific. For example, 4A specifies that two 
or less fatalities occurred, there are 5-10 serious injuries, property damage is between 5-10 
million RMB, or the number of derailed carts and stoppage periods can vary depending on 
the type of trains and types of routes. In general, the type 4A is more severe than that of 
4B, 4C, and 4D. The least severe category, 4D, may involve shunting conflict, wrong or 
not timely signal to cause the train to stop, mail loading and unloading operations delay the 




4.1.3 Study area Selection 
Guangzhou Railway Group manages the longest High-Speed Rail line among the 18 
regional companies. The region also has China ’s largest island, Hainan Island. Two of the 
four first-tier cities: Shenzhen and Guangzhou. Hong Kong, one of the world's financial 
centers, is also connected to China's railway network through Guangzhou Railway Group. 
The rich geographical characteristics and the multi-level economic development of the 
region have made Guangzhou Railway Group possess all the characteristics of China's 
High-Speed Rail. The following are the specific characteristics of this area:  
Guangzhou Railway Group is located in the south-central part of China, and it has 
jurisdiction over some railways in Guangdong, Hunan and Hainan. It is located in Beijing-
Guangzhou line, Jiaoliu line, Shanghai-Kunming line, Yuhuai line, Hengliu line, Xianggui 
line, Guangmao line and Beijing. The 9th line and the Guangzhou-Shenzhen, Shichang, 
Guangmei and other lines and the Guangdong, Hainan West Ring Line and Pingnan have 
a total of 4907.6 kilometers to operate the general-speed railway. The High-Speed Rail 
includes the Beijing-Guangzhou High-Speed Rail, the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong 
High-Speed Rail and the Xiamen-Shenzhen railway. Shanghai-Kunming Passenger 
Dedicated Line, Guiguang Passenger Dedicated Line, and Nanguang Railway. 
The total length of the line is 10483.7 kilometers, the operating mileage is 4907.6 
kilometers, the electrified operating mileage is 2005.554 kilometers, and the contact 
network is 72146.693 kilometers. There are 11785 group of Taoyuan, 2754 bridges, 
301,637 meters, 964 tunnels, 435,043 meters, culverts, 19916, 527,074 meters. There are 
1,291 locomotives, including 726 diesel locomotives and 565 electric locomotives; 4,322 
passenger cars, with 11,12 vehicles in line. There are 456 jurisdiction stations, including 6 
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special stations, 15 first-class stations, 23 second-class stations, and 40 third-class stations. 
There are 6 marshalling stations. There are 477 interlocking stations, of which 294 are relay 
interlocking stations. The automatic blocking line is 2033 kilometers, and the semi-
automatic blocking line is 3372.7 kilometers. 
The study area of this article involves three provinces in China, including Hunan 
Province, Guangdong Province and Hainan Province from north to south. The hills in all 
three provinces accounted for a relatively high proportion, of which Hunan hills accounted 
for 70.2% of the total area of the province, and water areas accounted for 5.3%; 
Guangdong's hilly and mountainous terrain accounted for about 62% of the province's area, 
and the rest were plain. The main land part of Hainan Province is Hainan Island. The island 
takes mountainous terrain as the main terrain, and a high-speed ring railway is built around 
the island's central mountain range. 
 
4.2 Data Collection 
The data used in this research comes from the compilation of accidents prepared by 
Guangzhou Railway Group. This book has not been published and is only for internal use. 
The information includes 68 railway accidents with a time span of 2013-2017. According 
to the accident responsibility department, all accidents are divided into six chapters: 
Operation Department, Drive Department, Energy and Signal Department, Rolling Stock 
Department, Tracks and Structures Department and Subcontractors Department. Each 
accident includes the occurrence of the accident, time, location, route, repair or rescue 
treatment method and accident lost. Each accident record also comes with the judgment of 
the cause of the accident and the judgment of responsibility. The 68 accidents include 28 
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High-Speed Rail accidents and 40 regular railway accidents. Since there is currently no 
obvious distinction between High-Speed Rail and regular railways in management, the 
judgment criteria for High-Speed Rail accidents are as follows: 
1. The accident happened on a High-Speed Rail line. 
2. The accident vehicle is a high-speed train or EMU vehicle. 
3. If the accident occurs at a station, it must be a newly built High-Speed Rail 
station on the High-Speed Rail line. 
4. The accident involves damage to High-Speed Rail facilities, vehicles or 
employees, or the cause of the accident is related to the construction, 
maintenance and repair of High-Speed Rail.  
 
4.3 Data Overview 
4.3.1 National Level 
According to limited data, the state of railway transportation safety in China can be 
observed at the national level. The total number of railroad accidents are generally tallied 
according to the classification presented above. As mentioned earlier, there is no separate 
report for High-Speed Rail operations and even the railway accident numbers were 
removed from the annual bulletin since 2013. The only available data are from 2011 and 
2012. As shown in Figure 4. 1, there was only one “extremely serious” Level I accident in 
the two years combined and it belongs to the accident took place along the Fuzhou – 
Wenzhou Line on July 23, 2011.  
The infamous “7.23” accident had claimed 40 lives, including three train 
crewmembers. The official statistics claimed that 172 people were injured and the railway 
segment was out of service for 32 hours and 35 minutes. Comparing to the serious Level I 
or II accidents, the total number of types 4D accidents/incident seem large at 1,997 and 
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2,318 for 2011 and 2012 respective. However, when putting in the contest of 93,000 route 
miles or 1.86 billion passengers transported annually, the incident rates per route mile or 
per passenger mile travelled (PMT) is much lower than that of US.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Railway accidents in China, 2011 and 2012. 
Sources: Railway Statistical Bulletin, 2011, 2012. 
 
On the other hand, one accident is too many. In 2011, the Chinese railway 
department interrupted the operation for a total of 119 hours and 6 minutes due to accidents, 
and the economic loss was 247,031,300 (RMB). In 2012, the railway operation was 
interrupted for 100 hours and 27 minutes, and the economic loss was 62.926 million 
(RMB). With the extension of the High-Speed Rail, the High-Speed Rail will soon cover 
all the large cities in China, and the railroad tracks will soon cross the border. More cities 
mean more complex networks, and the disruption of any node or line will have a huge 
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impact on the network. Research and prevention of accidents will definitely be an 
important aspect of High-Speed Rail operations.     
4.3.2 Accident Trending 
According to accident statistics (Figure 4.2), the number of accidents of Guangzhou 
Railway Group has been stable since 2013-2014, and reached the most in 2015, but in 2016 
The number of accidents has dropped significantly. It shows that the security situation has 
improved in 2016.  
By observing the accident data and the operating line length together, we can find 
that the operating line length has increased significantly in 2015, and the number of 
accidents in the same period has increased correspondingly. It can be inferred that a large 
number of new lines were put into operation in a short period of time, which had an 
important impact on the daily operations of the enterprise. According to the STAMP model, 
the ability to control the safety constraints of the railway system is weakened. The 
constraints here can be management capabilities; the number of operating or maintaining 
employees, the level of training and experience; the reliability of the equipment, etc. 
During the period of 2016-2017, the length of operating lines changed relatively smoothly, 
and the number of accidents decreased significantly each year. This can prove the previous 
conclusion from the opposite direction: the system's constraint on safety is recovering, 
maybe the staff of different departments have gained enough experience, and maybe the 




Figure 4.2 Accidents trending (Guangzhou, 2013-2017). 
 
Regarding the proportion analysis of accident types, the proportion of B, C, and D 
accidents has been stable. Class C accidents accounted for the largest proportion between 
2013 and 2017, and tripled in 2015 compared to the previous year. By querying the 
classification criteria for railway traffic accidents in the "Rules for Investigation and 
Handling of Railway Traffic Accidents", C and D-level accidents belong to the general 
category without causing casualties or obvious property losses (the judgment criterion is 
whether the property loss exceeds RMB 1 million) accident. C-level accidents are more 
serious and pose greater threats to operational safety. Although Class B accidents account 
for the smallest proportion, Class B accidents have higher hazards, or there are casualties, 
or property loss exceeds RMB 1 million, or the railway line is interrupted. Class B 
accidents also tripled in 2015 from the previous year, and together with Class C accidents 















4.3.3 Accident Location 
Figure 4.3 shows the location of accident during 2013-2017. The first factor that affects 
the location of the accident should be geography. Due to the development of China's civil 
engineering and construction technology, the construction of High-Speed Rail has crossed 
the obstacles of the terrain. You can find that there are High-Speed Rail tracks on any 
terrain in China. Therefore, the location of the railway accident did not reflect very obvious 
geographical features, and only a few accidents that occurred in tunnels and bridges could 
be found. 
During the study period, more than 90% (or even 100% in 2013 and 2013) of 
accidents occurred within the scope of open lines and stations, of course, this is also the 
main body of the railway. In most years (2013 and 2015-2017), the proportion of accidents 
that occurred at the station range was higher than on the line. The reason is that the station 
environment is more complicated. The station not only has the same track, signal, power, 
communication and other equipment as the line, but also more supplies, station 
maintenance, passenger and freight facilities and more types of workers. All of the above-
mentioned complex conditions converge at the variability of the different parts of the 
station, organization, individual, equipment, etc., and cause resonance, causing the station 




Figure 4.3 Accidents location (Guangzhou, 2013-2017). 
 
 
4.3.4 Accident Department 
Internal departments 
The "accident department" appeared in the accident investigation report through 
investigation and study of the accident, and believed that the accident was caused by the 
mistake of this department. The division of departments is directly related to the Chinese 
railway management system. In the Chinese railway management system, the operating 
department is divided into five departments according to the work content: 
1. Operating depot: In charge of train operation control and command, operation 
monitoring and management of passenger, freight and other services to 
ensure operating income. 
2. Drive crew depot: In charge of the operation, maintenance and repair of 
railway locomotives. 
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signals, locomotive signals, and communication systems. It is also 
responsible for the power supply of railway lines and vehicles. 
4. Rolling stock depot: Responsible for the operation, maintenance and repair 
of train vehicles (excluding locomotive). The depot is also the place where 
vehicles are operated, managed, parked, repaired, and maintained in the urban 
rail transit system (subway, urban light rail). 
5. Tracks and structures: In charge of maintenance and repair of railway lines, 
bridges, tunnels and some equipment. 
6. Subcontractors: an additional category. Subcontractors are responsible for 
railway engineering construction projects through outsourcing contracts. 
Because the work area is highly coincident with the railway operation area, 
the behavior of the subcontractor has a direct impact on railway safety. 
 
Tracks and Structures Department 
As shown in Figure 4.4, the highest percentage of accidents occurred in the rail and 
structural sectors since 2014, which proves that this is the most dangerous sector in the 
railway system. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, this department is responsible for 
the maintenance and repair of all infrastructure of the railway system. As the department's 
large working area has thousands of kilometers of railway tracks and bridges that need to 
be inspected daily to ensure traffic safety. The department has the most employees and the 
highest work intensity, which requires management, training and cooperation between 
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departments to be skilled and effective. Mistakes in any detail are weakened security 
constraints and may lead to accidents.  
 
 
Figure 4.4 Accidents department (Guangzhou, 2013-2017). 
 
Typical Year  
Observing the distribution of the number of accidents in different years, it is found 
that the proportion of departments in 2015 is very representative. As mentioned above, the 
number of accidents in 2015 was the highest during the study period. Also, in 2015, the 
accidents in the four departments Track and structures, Energy, driver and operation were 
almost equal, and the sum accounted for 90% of the total accidents. This once again proves 
that the negative impact of a large number of new railway lines on operational safety in the 
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The proportion of drive depot accidents has been increasing from 2013 to 2015. 
China Railway Administration has admitted that the number and quality of EMUs system 
staff are very weak, and in 2017, it filled up 6,400 mechanics. Some figures show that at 
the end of 2016, employees under the age of 30 accounted for 80% of the total number of 
employees in the EMUs system. Age is directly related to experience. Young employees 
’poor operational skills and emergency response capabilities are the biggest hidden dangers 
to EMUs’ operational safety. The High-Speed Rail accident that occurred in the Lion 
Ocean Tunnel in Guangdong Province in February 2018 was due to the inexperience and 
improper handling of the on-board mechanics, which caused the line to be interrupted for 
8 hours, 19 train trips were cancelled or delayed and the journey of thousands of passengers 
Delayed or cancelled. 
4.4 Data Quality 
The essence of network analysis is statistical analysis with the help of some methods of 
graph theory. Regardless of degree or strength, it is the statistics of a certain aspect of the 
incident that develops into an accident. Therefore, the key to the success of network 
analysis is data. The data problems identified in the study included data availability and 
accuracy. 
4.4.1 Accessibility   
The access to accident data is limited. The 68 accident reports used in this study came from 
the internal training materials of a regional railway company in China. Because it is a safety 
training material, the basic information of the accident is retained, but the attachment 
materials for investigation reports such as testimonies, test reports, and schematic diagrams 
 
78 
are deleted. This is not the most ideal data. But in a short period of time, this will be the 
best data available on China's railway safety research. Under the current Chinese 
management system, out of fear of the negative impact of public accident data on social 
stability and economic development has prevented the disclosure of accident reports in 
China. This makes accident data almost impossible to access. An exception is the 7.23 
accident in 2011, because the losses caused by the accident were extremely large (forty 
people were killed and 172 injured), and the accident report was published in full. 
The unavailability of accident information is also related to the accident 
investigation system. China has a complete accident reporting and investigation system 
and has been established in legal form. However, there are still some areas that need to be 
rethought in the details of this system. The first is the accident investigation agency. 
According to the “Regulations for Emergency Rescue, Investigation and Handling of 
Railway Traffic Accidents” that began in 2013, accident investigations are presided over 
by different agencies according to the accident level. The details are shown in the Table 
4.2. 
Table 4.2 Investigation Agency of Railroad Accident 
Accident 
Level Investigation Agency 
Level Ⅰ  State Council or an agency authorized by the State Council 
Level Ⅱ Railway Administration 
Level Ⅲ & Ⅳ 
Railway Operation Management Agency or 
State Council (if necessary) 




The main problem is that the railway operating unit and the railway supervisory 
unit are unified in China, namely the China National Railway Group (and its regional 
branches). The investigation organization of the accident is taken by the accident 
occurrence organization, which is a typical problem of integration of government 
administration with enterprise in the state-owned economy. In fact, this has changed from 
an independent accident investigation to an internal responsibility investigation. The "State 
Administration of Work Safety" (similar to the inter-departmental version of NTSB, later 
reorganized as the National Emergency Department) was almost excluded from the 
accident investigation and was only used as a data collection department. This cast doubt 
on the credibility and transparency of the accident investigation. In fact, after the 7.23 
accident investigation report was published, there were voices questioning that the accident 
report masked the true cause of the accident. Accident liability tends to be borne by a 
commercial company that appears to have no contact with the government. 
4.4.2 Accuracy 
The content of the accident investigation report is also insufficient. As shown in the Table 
4.3. China's railway accident report clearly lacks research on the cause and development 
chain of the accident. The vast majority of the report, about 3/4, is used to analyze accident 







Table 4.3 Contents Requirement for Investigation Report 
Index Content 
1 Accident profile. 
2 Casualties and direct economic losses caused by the accident. 
3 The cause and nature of the accident. 
4 Identification of accident liability and suggestions for handling the person responsible for the accident. 
5 Advice on accident prevention and rectification measures. 
6 Certification materials related to the accident. 
Source: State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2007. 
 
The ideal investigation report comes from the British RAIB agency. The Railway 
Accident Investigation Service (RAIB) is the agency responsible for independent 
investigation of railway accidents in the UK and Channel Tunnel. Established in 2005. The 
RAIB report focuses on analyzing the cause of the accident rather than who is responsible. 
As shown in the Table 4.4, the accident report records the sequence of events in the accident 
and analyzes in detail the causes of the accident including immediate cause, underlaying 
cause and causal factors. In addition, a monthly summary and annual report of the railway 
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The agencies involved in the investigation of train accidents in the United States 
are FRA and NTSB. FRA is an agency of the United States Department of Transportation 
that manages federal-wide railways. NTSB is an independent federal agency responsible 
for investigating traffic accidents. Three documents will be generated after a railroad 
accident in the United States. These are the accident brief issued by NTSB, the accident 
preliminary report and the investigation report issued by FRA. The difference between 
these three documents is that the preliminary report simply records the status of the 
accident and the composition and work plan of the accident investigation team, with the 
shortest length. The brief records in more detail the geographical information of the 
accident, the information of the rails and vehicles, and the results of various inspections. 
The obvious difference is that the brief finally guessed the cause of the accident. The length 
is slightly longer. The investigation report is located on the FRA website, and the report is 
more focused on record archiving, and the accidents are recorded in standardized forms. 
The main difference in the investigation report is that a formal conclusion has been made 
on the cause of the accident. Generally speaking, the survey report is the longest. The 
accident brief and preliminary report can be obtained on the NTSB website soon after the 








This chapter introduces the steps and tools used in complete network construction. And a 
case has been used to demonstrate the structural characteristics of the network. 
 
5.1 Causal Factors Coding and Directed 
By reading the accident report, use the IRAB factor code to encode the accident. Coding 
manual used for coding, the author combined both accidents investigate methods from UK 
and China. In United Kingdom, there is an agency named Rail Accident Investigation 
Branch (RAIB) in charge of accident investigate. In these accident reports from RAIB, 
various factors can directly or indirectly result in accidents. To apply these causal factors 
for analysis, they are summarized and divided into 5 classes in a systemic way: ‘‘Human 
(H)’’, ‘‘Equipment & Machine (EM)’’, ‘‘Environment (E)’’ ‘‘Management (M)’’, and 
‘‘Accident type (A, B, C, D)’’. These five classes can contain almost all of the causal 
factors which are generated by workers, managers, machinery, electrical equipment, 
external environment, construction establishment, management, etc. I take almost all the 
causal factors classification for study in my research, beside the category “accident type”. 
The reason is accident type is overlap with some other factors in RAIB’s system and more 
importation is there is a better choice. 
As mentioned in previous chapter, China's railway administration has developed 
detailed accident classification regulation which called “Regulations on Emergency 
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Rescue and Investigation of Railway Traffic Accidents”. The regulations stipulate complex 
and detailed accident classification rules. In addition to the classification of four different 
levels of accidents according to the severity of the accident, the regulations also specify the 
specific types of accidents under the fourth level (also named as general accidents). In the 
regulations, the fourth-level accident is subdivided into four sub-categories, named A, B, 
C, and D accident types. (Appendix B) Among them, the A/B type accidents are determined 
according to the severity of the accident, such as the number of casualties, economic losses 
and the interruption of railway operation time. The C/D type accident is classified into 46 
accidents and has an accident code according to the form and cause of the accident. 
In the study, the accident type code was included in the accident report from China, 
and more than 98% of the accidents belonged to the C/D category in the fourth-level 
accident, that is, the accident coded according to the accident pattern and cause. So, I only 
used the event code from RAIB in the cause of the accident, and I used the code from the 
Chinese railway administration when selecting the accident type code. 
The following is an example of encoding: 
  
Original accident record: (Originally in Chinese, translated) 
“In the construction plan of the Guangzhou South High-Speed Rail Engineering 
Section, there is no clear responsibility for the lead driver. The lead driver is temporarily 
replaced before the start of construction. The leading driver did not perform his due 
responsibilities during the lead, and the location of the reverse pit stop signal at 
Guangzhou North Station was unclear. When the locomotive signal showed a red and 
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yellow light, the driver was not prompted to confirm the reverse pit stop signal. The display 
of the machine, especially when using the GSM handset to control with Guangzhou North 
Station, is not focused, mistakenly listening to "Parking outside Guangzhou North Station" 
as "Parking at Guangzhou North Station 4", and communicating the error to the driver 
Information and instructions are the main cause of accidents. Station supervisors are not 
aware of the critical safety risks, and the large-scale machine grinding in the interval and 
the maintenance of the electrical switch in the station are carried out at the same time. In 
particular, the key safety risks of the maintenance of the electrical switch on the running 
path of the polished vehicle back to the station are not under key prevention and control. 
There was no prompt for the duty officer to strengthen the joint control of the vehicle. In 
the end, when the driver showed a red light in the reverse direction and the red and yellow 
lights in the locomotive signal, the driver illegally pressed the [OK] key of the GYK device 
and entered the No. 4 turnout in the station at a speed of 14km / h. The vehicle squeezed 
out of the movable rail of the turnout in the reverse position and stopped, resulting in a 
C10 accident.” 
 
Step 1: Analyze the accident process and break down the accident into several 
consecutive events.  
Sample:  
Accident 60617 development process after abbreviation: 
1. The management of the construction organization process is weak, the 
management staff have insufficient work plans, and the management staff 
temporarily changes the driver before the construction begins 
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2. The driver did not do his due diligence, wrong password and wrong operation 
3. Failure of the supervision mechanism, failure to detect driver's operation 
errors, and failure of safety precautions 
4. Under wrong operation, the train passes the red signal in a fault state 
5. Mechanical impact of turnout caused by train impact 
6. The train rushed into the signal light and accident C10 occurred 
 
Step 2: Encode the event obtained in step one by IRAB code, refer to Appendix 
A. 
Accident 60617:    M03 H04 M05 EM34 EM16 C10 
Repeat steps 1 and 2 to process all accident reports to obtain Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Causal Factors for All Accident (Guangzhou, 2013-2017) 
Accident ID Causal Factors 
 
40106 H05 EM43 D10     
50401 M02 H05 EM43 EM26 D10   
50521 M03 H10 C10     
50702 H03 EM04 EM26 D05    
50729 H08 M05 H20 EM07 C24   
60322 M05 H08 H06 EM05 D01   
60514 M05 EM05 C16     
60518 H08 H06 EM05 C12    




Table 5.2 Causal Factors for All Accident (Guangzhou, 2013-2017) - continued 
Accident ID Causal Factors 
 
61010 M02 H04 EM48 C09    
61126 M06 H08 E04 EM02 H06 EM07 C25 
61221 H08 H20 EM26 D09    
70113 H04 EM36 D15     
70128 H10 EM26 C09     
70602 M05 EM07 EM12 C13    
70713 H04 EM34 D15     
71011 H04 EM34 C10     
30115 H20 EM05 C13     
30416 M05 H20 EM28 EM43 D01   
30521 M03 M02 H03 EM03 EM25 C19  
30604 M03 H04 EM34 C10    
30607 H08 EM04 H10 EM07 C08   
30810 EM27 H04 EM26 D15    
31122 M05 EM17 EM25 EM26 C14   
40118 H06 EM44 EM26 C12    
40613 H05 EM07 EM22 C02    
40623 M05 H06 EM39 EM17 EM25 C14  
40803 H03 H04 EM01 D02    
40902 H19 EM14 EM26 C02    
41021 M01 M02 H03 H07 B01   
41213 M03 M02 H10 H07 H20 EM05 C13 
41220 H20 M05 H06 EM07 EM26 D10  
50129 M01 H03 M05 H08 EM29 C15  




Table 5.3 Causal Factors for All Accident (Guangzhou, 2013-2017) - continued 
Accident ID Causal Factors 
 
50425 M03 M05 H03 EM48 C13   
50518 M02 H07 B01     
50629 M01 H07 B01     
50711 H01 H03 EM28 D12    
50726 M05 H03 H17 EM25 D19   
50728 M03 M02 H08 EM39 EM25 EM26 C14 
50824 M03 M02 H20 EM05 EM26 C13  
50826 M01 H01 EM34 C10    
50919 M03 H04 EM49 EM29 C23   
51004 H17 EM34 C10     
51007 H03 M05 H08 EM24 C24   
51009 M06 H13 EM10 EM26 C13   
51021 H04 EM24 C08     
51120 M01 H07 B01     
51130 M03 H08 M05 EM37 D09   
51212 M03 M02 E01 EM06 EM23 EM39 C14 
51218 H01 EM34 C09     
51226 M03 H08 M05 H20 EM05 C13  
60229 M01 H08 B01     
60323 M06 H06 E07 EM23 EM05 C13  
60328 M01 H08 B01     
60728 H07 M05 EM46 EM22 D02   
60913 M03 H13 EM05 H04 EM16 C16  
60919 M03 H06 EM29 D10    




Table 5.4 Causal Factors for All Accident (Guangzhou, 2013-2017) - continued 
Accident ID Causal Factors 
 
61102 H06 EM05 D08     
61108 M03 H10 EM13 D10    
61122 H08 EM43 EM05 C13    
70303 M02 H20 EM05 C13    
70327 H10 EM29 EM16 D03    
70413 H06 EM02 B04     
70507 M01 H08 B01     
70528 H17 EM43 EM10 C08    
70901 M06 H20 EM26 D09    
 
Step 3, according to the sequence of events, add the direction of the accident. The 
direction directly reflects the causal connection during the accident. The development of 
some accidents is particularly complicated, which will disrupt the sequence of event 
development when performing the second step of encoding, so we must rearrange the 
causality of event development. This step is also giving direction to the network. 
Sample:  
Accident 60617: M03 → H04 → M05 → EM34 → EM16 → C10 
By processing all data in the same way, the development chain of all accidents 





Table 5.5 Event Chains for All Accidents (Guangzhou, 2013-2017) 
Accident ID Event Chain 
30810 EM27 → H04 → EM26 → D15 
51218 H01 → EM34 → C09 
50711 H01 → H03 → EM28 → D12 
40803 H03 → H04 → EM01 → D02 
50702 H03 → EM04 → EM26 → D05 
51007 H03 → M05 → H08 → EM24 → C24 
51021 H04 → EM24 → C08 
71011 H04 → EM34 → C10 
70113 H04 → EM36 → D15 
70713 H04 → EM34 → D15 
40106 H05 → EM43 → D10 
40613 H05 → EM07 → EM22 → C02 
61102 H06 → EM05 → D08 
70413 H06 → EM02 → B04 
40118 H06 → EM44 → EM26 → C12 
60728 H07 → M05 → EM46 → EM22 → D02 
61122 H08 → EM43 → EM05 → C13 
61221 H08 → H20 → EM26 → D09 
30607 H08 → EM04 → H10 → EM07 → C08 
60518 H08 → H06 → EM05 → C12 
50729 H08 → M05 → H20 → EM07 → C24 
70128 H10 → EM26 → C09 
70327 H10 → EM29 → EM16 → D03 
51004 H17 → EM34 → C10 




Table 5.6 Event Chains for All Accidents (Guangzhou, 2013-2017) - continued 
Accident ID Event Chain 
50226 H17 → H03 → EM36 → D13 
40902 H19 → EM14 → EM26 → C02 
30115 H20 → EM05 → C13 
41220 H20 → M05 → H06 → EM07 → EM26 → D10 
50826 M01 → H01 → EM34 → C10 
50129 M01 → H03 → M05 → H08 → EM29 → C15 
41021 M01 → M02 → H03 → H07 → B01 
50629 M01 → H07 → B01 
51120 M01 → H07 → B01 
60229 M01 → H08 → B01 
60328 M01 → H08 → B01 
70507 M01 → H08 → B01 
50401 M02 → H05 → EM43 → EM26 → D10 
61010 M02 → H04 → EM48 → C09 
70303 M02 → H20 → EM05 → C13 
50518 M02 → H07 → B01 
30521 M03 → M02 → H03 → EM03 → EM25 → C19 
50521 M03 → H10 → C10 
60919 M03 → H06 → EM29 → D10 
50919 M03 → H04 → EM49 → EM29 → C23 
30604 M03 → H04 → EM34 → C10 
51212 M03 → M02 → E01 → EM06 → EM23 → EM39 → C14 
41213 M03 → M02 → H10 → H07 → H20 → EM05 → C13 
50728 M03 → M02 → H08 → EM39 → EM25 → EM26 → C14 




Table 5.7 Event Chains for All Accidents (Guangzhou, 2013-2017) - continued 
Accident ID Event Chain 
60913 M03 → H13 → EM05 → H04 → EM16 → C16 
50824 M03 → M02 → H20 → EM05 → EM26 → C13  
61006 M03 → H06 → EM07 → H04 → EM22 → D02 
61108 M03 → H10 → EM13 → D10 
50425 M03 → M05 → H03 → EM48 → C13 
51226 M03 → H08 → M05 → H20 → EM05 → C13 
51130 M03 → H08 → M05 → EM37 → D09 
50726 M05 → H03 → H17 → EM25 → D19 
31122 M05 → EM17 → EM25 → EM26 → C14 
40623 M05 → H06 → EM39 → EM17 → EM25 → C14 
70602 M05 → EM07 → EM12 → C13 
30416 M05 → H20 → EM28 → EM43 → D01 
60322 M05 → H08 → H06 → EM05 → D01 
60514 M05 → EM05 → C16 
70901 M06 → H20 → EM26 → D09 
60323 M06 → H06 → E07 → EM23 → EM05 → C13 
61126 M06 → H08 → E04 → EM02 → H06 → EM07 → C25 
51009 M06 → H13 → EM10 → EM26 → C13 
 
 
5.2 Network Established 
Combining the event chains of all accidents, different accidents may have the same events, 
such as driver errors, rainy weather, or the same mechanical failure. Combining all the 
incident chains of accidents, you can get a network. All the network diagrams in this article 
are generated by MATLAB. By converting the contents of Table 5.2 into a matrix, and 
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then writing the code, you can quickly complete the drawing work. The results are shown 
in Figure 5.2. 
The tool used for network construction and mathematical calculation in this study 















Figure 5.2 is composed of two parts. The lower left corner is a full picture, which 
cannot be seen in detail due to space limitations. So, I took a part of it and enlarged it for 
explanation. 
Node and Edge: 
The so-called complex network is actually very simple. The entire network has only 
two parts: nodes and edges. The node is the event mentioned above, and the edge is the 
causal relationship between the events. The arrows on the lines indicate the direction of 
causality. The two ends of the arrows represent the cause and effect of a pair of causal 
relations.  
Degree and Weight: 
The number on the line represents the weight of the edge, because this picture has 
not been weighted, so the weight of the edge is 1. Each node has a line connected to other 
nodes, the number of lines represents the importance of this node, that is the weight of the 
node. And there may be many edges between two nodes, so how many nodes are connected 
to this node is the degree of this node. 
Shortest path length and Diameter: 
There may be no edge connection between the two nodes, but most points will be 
connected by other points, then the two nodes connected by the least edge are the shortest 
path length between the nodes. The length between the two longest points of the path is the 





The clustering coefficient is used to measure the agglomeration between the surrounding 
nodes of a node. The more connections between other nodes connected to a node, the higher 
the clustering coefficient. But not all clustering coefficients can be calculated at all points 
in all graphs. For example, in some networks, the connectivity between nodes is not rich 
enough, it may not be possible to calculate this value. 
Mean clustering coefficient is a parameter that measures the agglomeration of the 
entire network. It is obtained by calculating the average value of all clustering coefficients 
in the network. 
Betweenness centrality 
betweenness centrality is a parameter used to measure the position of a point. It 
means that the shortest path through this point accounts for the percentage of the entire 
network. Therefore, the maximum value of betweenness centrality is 1, and betweenness 
centrality equal to 1 means that the shortest path of any pair of nodes in this network passes 







6.1 Overall Accident Analysis 
Figure 6.1 is a causation network modeled on 68 railway accidents that occurred between 
2013 and 2017 in Guangzhou Railway Group. The 68 accidents were decomposed into 76 
nodes and 233 edges, which also means 76 events. In all accidents, they may have happened 
many times in different accidents. These events combined a total of 233 control-feedback 
loops. Obviously, all of these controls failed in these cases, which led to 68 accidents. It 
can be seen in the figure that there are multiple connecting lines with arrows between many 
nodes. The arrow means the direction, indicating that one event triggered another. The 
presence of multiple lines indicates that the same chain reaction has occurred many times, 
which means that the network in this picture has not been weighted. 
The network is so complicated, so we analyze the characteristics of the network 










6.1.1 Degree and Degree Distribution 
Figure 6.2 shows the degree distribution of nodes (events) in all accidents. The highest 
degree is EM26 (Train delayed), which is far more than the degree value of other events, 
showing that EM26 (Train delayed) is very important in the network. It also shows that 
EM26 (Train delayed) appears very frequently in these five years of accidents: as an 
accident result, delay is the most common result of train accidents in these five years. As 
the cause of accidents, train delays are also the most likely to cause various accidents: 
delays can cause confusion in management, train dispatching, and the use of station lines, 
causing instability in the entire system and increasing requirements for other safety 
controls. 
The other common second to fifth accident factors are: H04 (Driver’s operation 
mistake), M05 (Not sufficient inspection and Supervision), H08 (Track worker’s 
negligence), H03 (Conductor’s mistake). Three of the top five accident factors are staff 





Figure 6.2 Degree distribution (2013-2017, all accidents). 
 
Figure 6.3 illustrates that cumulative node degree distribution of Network follows 
an power law as 𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘)~2.122𝑥𝑥−1.318 ( 𝑅𝑅2 = 0.8722), The top 7.89% factors account for 
a majority (53.79%) of all causation relations, and the most (55.26 %) of factors occur only 














































































Figure 6.3 Cumulative degree distribution (2013-2017, all accidents). 
 
6.1.2 Strength and Strength Distribution 
Figure 6.4 shows the strength distribution of nodes (events) in all railway accidents over 
five years. The strength is weighted twice on the basis of the degree, not only considering 
the connectivity of the node in the network (the number of other points connected), but 
also considering the strength of the connection (the weight of the edge) and the size of the 
end node of the link (the severity of the accident). After weighting twice, it can be found 
that the importance of nodes in the network has changed significantly. EM26 (Train 
delayed) is no longer higher than other nodes, the most important node becomes H08(Track 
worker’s negligence), and the second to fifth causal factors are: EM26 (Train delayed), 
M05 (Not sufficient inspection and supervision), EM05 (Train minor damaged), H04 



















equipment factor, and the management factor ranks third, showing the importance of 
management factors in the accident. 
 
Figure 6.4 Strength distribution (2013-2017, all accidents). 
 
Figure 6.5 illustrates that cumulative node strength distribution of weighted 
network follows an exponential function as 𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘)~1.7164𝑥𝑥−1.003(𝑅𝑅2 = 0.8652). The top 
13.16% factors account for a majority (54.07%) of all the times of occurrences, and the 




































































































6.1.3 Shortest Path and Diameter 
In an unweighted causation network that mixes High-Speed Rail and regular railway 
accidents over a five-year period, the average path length is 3.11. This means that causality 
related to another factor requires approximately three steps in the network. The average 
path of the causality related to the accident is 3.09, which means that about 3 causal factors 
are needed to cause the accident. The diameter of the network is 9, and from E01 (Rainy 
condition) / 04 (Freezing temperatures) to EM13 (Wagon failure) are the two most distant 
nodes in the network. This indicates a possibility: the occurrence of harsh environment 
(Rainy condition / Freezing temperatures) can lead to the occurrence of Wagon failure 
through nine steps. At the same time, it means that if you want to avoid accidents, you can 
strengthen the control at any of the nine nodes. 
6.1.4 Clustering Coefficient 
Figure 6.7 shows the clustering coefficient in the causation network of all accidents. The 
clustering coefficient of the four nodes reaches 1, and two of them belong to the machine 
equipment category, showing that the machine equipment node tends to gather together. 
The overall clustering coefficient of the network is 0.4098, which shows that the 
aggregation between the nodes is high. Combining the average path of the network 
discussed in the previous paragraph is only 3.11, the combination of the two features makes 
the entire network very consistent with the characteristics of the small world network. This 
means that most factors can influence each other, and it is easy to produce the "resonance" 
phenomenon mentioned in the control theory. which means that the influences of the 




Figure 6.7 Clustering coefficient (2013-2017, all accidents). 
 
6.1.5 Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness centrality indicates a possibility that the probability of this node on the 
shortest path connecting a pair of nodes. To a certain extent, Betweenness centrality is the 
advanced version of Degrees: Betweenness centrality selects the optimal solution (shortest 
path) on the basis of accessibility 
Figure 6.8 shows the top 30% of the Betweenness centrality of all railway accident 
causation networks. Because weight and direction are considered, Betweenness centrality 
can reflect the historical trajectory and possible trajectory of accident development. The 
highest ranked EM26 (Train delayed), H06 reflects that a key chain, the untimely track 













Figure 6.8 Betweenness centrality (2013-2017, all accidents). 
 
6.2 Annual Accident Analysis 
6.2.1 Annual data 
According to the annual data report, the following networks were drawn. showing the 
causation network from 2013 to 2017. It can be observed that the spatial characteristics of 
the network are directly affected by the amount of data: 2013 with the least number of 
accidents is also the year with the simplest network structure. The network structure was 
also the most complicated in 2015 as the number of accidents increased. In fact, the 
limitations of methodology, the reasons why it is called a complex network depends on a 
huge number of nodes and edges connecting vertices. And when the network is no longer 


























Figure 6.11 Causation network (2017, all accidents). 
 
6.2.2 Annual Comparison 
Degree and Strength distribution 
Figure 6.12 is a summary chart of the top ten factors each year from 2013 to 2017. Each 
factor includes two values, degree-all and strength-all. Degree-all is the sum of degree-in 
and degree-out, strength-all is the sum of strength-in and strength-out. The abscissa 
includes five years, so through the continuous polyline in the figure, you can observe the 
change of several elements in five years: on the whole, the element is in the rising period 
from 2015 to 2016, which matches the annual change in the number of accidents. The most 
obvious changes are EM26 (Train delayed), M02 (Inadequate safety precautions) and H20 
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(Staff left machine/goods/material on the track), which maintained a continuous growth 
every year from 2013 to 2015. H03 maintained growth only in 2014-2015. H08 (Track 
worker’s negligence) had a short-term growth in 2015-2016, and then fell sharply in 2017. 
Also falling are M01 (Inadequate safety education for workers) and M03 (Weak 
management), both of which have decreased in 2015-2016. 
In 2015, two lines crossed on the graph, both of which are factors H07 (Worker was 
working in danger Conditions) and H08 (Track worker’s negligence) belonging to the 
human factor category. After the two factors are weighted, the strength value has greatly 
increased from the degree value. The same thing happened with H03 in 2014. After 
weighting, the importance of H03 in the network has increased. 
In addition to changes in railway safety, which can explain changes in element 
values, the distribution of accessibility and importance of each element is also directly 
related to the size of the network. In 2015-2016, when the network size is large (the amount 
of data is large), the line segment is on the ordinate the projection is more scattered. In 




Figure 6.12 Top 10 Causation factors of annual accident (2013-2017, all accidents).
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Path Length and Clustering Coefficient 
Table 6.1 shows the geometric characteristics of the network, including the network 
diameter, the average shortest path length and the clustering coefficient. Depending on the 
size and structure of the network, the clustering coefficient is not available in most years. 
The average shortest path length is obviously related to the network diameter, and the larger 
the diameter, the larger the average shortest path length. 
In 2015, due to abundant data and moderate network size, all network 
characteristics can be calculated. The average shortest path length and clustering 
coefficient can be combined to determine that the 2015 accident causation network 
conforms to the characteristics of the small world network. The various elements are 
closely connected, and the related influences are likely to cause the "resonance" 
phenomenon mentioned in the control theory. Managers need to strengthen the 
management of elements with a high clustering coefficient to eliminate security risks. 






2013 5 1.86 N/A 
2014 12 4.2 N/A 
2015 10 3.3 
Average C13 H03 H08 M05 
0.370 0.333 0.167 0.667 0.333 
2016 12 4.16 N/A 




Table 6.2 summarizes the value of Betweenness centrality ranked in the top nine each year 
for five years. The higher the element of Betweenness centrality, the more important it is 
in the causal chain of accident transmission. This is also where safety management should 
be reinforced. 
Table 6.2 Top 9 Betweenness Centrality (2013-2017, All Accidents) 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Factors 
EM25 0.390 H06 0.629 H08 0.320 H08 0.340 H20 0.148 
EM17 0.303 H20 0.552 H03 0.308 H04 0.335 EM26 0.140 
EM26 0.303 M05 0.512 EM26 0.288 EM05 0.322 EM05 0.099 
M05 0.280 H07 0.468 EM25 0.281 H06 0.303 C13 0.081 
H20 0.270 EM07 0.456 EM39 0.265 M05 0.273 H10 0.081 
H04 0.230 EM26 0.317 H17 0.173 M03 0.168 EM12 0.059 
EM28 0.120 EM39 0.192 M02 0.160 H20 0.102 EM29 0.059 
EM03 0.077 H03 0.192 M05 0.137 EM29 0.075 EM07 0.032 
EM05 0.063 H10 0.163 EM29 0.104 EM16 0.066 EM16 0.032 
 
 
6.3 Regular Railway Accidents 
Figure 6.13 shows an unweighted causation network for regular railway accidents, which 




Figure 6.13 Causation network (2013-2017, regular accidents). 
 
6.3.1 Degree and Degree Distribution 
From the characteristics of the network, it can be found that the line density is significantly 
higher in the M (Management) and H (Human Factor) node areas than in other areas, 
reflecting that the intensity of causal connections related to M (Management) and H 
(Human Factor) is higher than in other areas. Statistics also prove this: Four of the top 6 
nodes in the degree distribution (shown in Figure 6.14) are Human factors. In the statistical 
data by category, EM (Equipment and Machine)-related causal connections account for the 
highest proportion, 42.9%. However, the average number of connections on each node is 
only 4.06, which means that an average of 4.06 nodes are connected to EM (Equipment 
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and Machine) nodes, only slightly higher than the network average level (3.81). The M 
(Management) and H (Human Factor) series nodes account for 29.8% and 12.7% of the 
causal connections, but the average number of connections is 6.83 and 7, which is much 
higher than the average level in the network. 
 
Figure 6.14 Degree distribution (2013-2017, regular accidents). 
 
Figure 6.15 illustrates that cumulative node degree distribution of Network follows 










































































a majority (57.55%) of all causation relations, and the most (52.78 %) of factors occur only 
1–2 times. The network has typical small-world model characteristics. 
 
 
Figure 6.15 Cumulative degree distribution (2013-2017, regular accidents). 
 
6.3.2 Strength and Strength Distribution 
Figure 6.16 shows the dual-weighted network. Compared with the unweighted network, 
























Figure 6.16 Causation network (2013-2017, regular accidents, weighted). 
 
The numerical changes that are greatly affected by weighting are M02 (Inadequate 
safety precautions, 8 as degree, 16 as strength), M03 (Weak management, 7 as degree, 15 
as strength), H08 (Track worker’s negligence, 11 as degree, 20.8 as strength), EM05 (Train 
minor damaged, 9 as degree, 19.6 as strength). This proves once again that the frequency 
and severity of accidents need to be included in the analysis of the cause of the accident. It 
needs to be noted that M01 and M03, both of which have only Out-Strength values, show 
that the lack of training and weak management only affects other factors, but have not been 
affected by other factors. The average value of strength is 5.41, which means that on 




Figure 6.17 Strength distribution (2013-2017, regular accidents). 
 
Figure 6.18 illustrates that cumulative node strength distribution of Network 
follows an power law as 𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘)~1.6991𝑥𝑥−1.072(𝑅𝑅2 = 0.8274). The top 15.28% factors 
account for a majority (54.48%) of all the times of occurrences, and 33.33% of factors 












































































Figure 6.18 Cumulative strength distribution (2013-2017, regular accidents). 
 
6.3.3 Shortest Path and Diameter 
In the regular railway accident causation network, the average path length is 2.77. This 
means that the causality related to another factor is about three steps in the network. The 
average path of the causality related to the accident is 3.10, which means that about 3 causal 
factors are needed to cause the accident. The network diameter is 7, and from E01 (Rainy 
condition) to C10 (Train over signal or stop sign) / 13 (A collision occurred while the train 
was running) are the two furthest pairs of nodes in the network. This indicates a possibility: 
the rainy weather can lead to the accident C15 (Braking system malfunction) / 23 
(Locomotive not tested) through 7 steps. At the same time, it means that if you want to 
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6.3.4 Clustering Coefficient 
Figure 6.19 shows the clustering coefficient in the causation network of regular railway 
accidents. Four of the top six factors belong to human factors, and all of them are greater 
than 0.3, which indicates that the factors of human factors tend to be clustered together. 
The aggregation coefficient of the entire network is 0.3562, which is much larger than the 
random network of the same size. The aggregation coefficient higher than 0.3 and the 
average path length less than 3 indicate that this network conforms to the characteristics of 
a small-world network. This means that elements can easily affect each other, thereby 
breaking the normal operation of the system. 
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6.3.5 Betweenness Centrality 
Figure 6.20 shows the top 30% of the Betweenness centrality of regular railway accident 
causation networks. The highest ranked EM26 (Train delayed), H04 (Driver’s operation 
mistake) reflects a critical chain that the mistake of the train driver is very likely to cause 
a delay in the train. 
In addition, four of the top five Betweenness centralities are all human factors, 
showing the importance of human factors in regular railway accidents. Strengthening the 
management of human factors will more effectively improve railway safety. 
 











(Regular Railway Accidents, 2013-2017)
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6.4 High-Speed Rail Accidents Analysis 
The High-Speed Rail accidents selected from all accident reports are broken down into 35 
events and 80 causal links according to the method described in Chapter 4. It is then 
modeled into 35 nodes and 80 edges to form the network shown in Figure 6.21 
 
Figure 6.21 Causation network (2013-2017, High-Speed Rail accidents). 
 
6.4.1 Degree and Degree Distribution 
As shows in the Figure 6.22, the factors with the highest connectivity in the High-Speed 
Rail accident (top 10%) are EM26 (Train delayed) M05 (Not sufficient inspection and 
Supervision) EM07 (The risk of the line) H08 (Track worker’s negligence) and H04 
(Driver’s operation mistake) (the last three have the same degree value), showing that train 
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delay is still the main factor for High-Speed Rail accidents, driver errors and supervision 
the shortcomings reflect the internal management problems of High-Speed Rail and the 
impact of employees on safety. This confirms the previous assumption that the large 
number of newly purchased high-speed trains has a negative impact on operational safety. 
In the equipment category, EM26 (Train delayed), EM07 (The risk of the line), 
EM05 (Train minor damaged), EM34 (Train passed red signal) are the most connected 
factors, which correspond to the slight loss in the accident (train delay and slight damage 
to the train), signal system and line safety. 
Among the human factors, the biggest threats to safety are H04 (driver misuse), 
H08 (track worker negligence) and H20 (employee left items on the track). 
The most frequent factor in the management process is M05 (Not sufficient 
inspection and Supervision), which means a lack of inspection and supervision. A large 
number of new lines and newly purchased vehicles have resulted in accidents due to 






Figure 6.22 Degree distribution (2013-2017, High-Speed Rail accidents). 
 
Figure 6.23 illustrates that cumulative node degree distribution of Network follows 
a power law as 𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘)~1.6362𝑥𝑥−1.573(𝑅𝑅2 = 0.8539). The top 14.29% factors account for 
a majority (58.33%) of all causation relations, and the most (65.71%) of factors occur only 



















































Figure 6.23 Cumulative degree distribution (2013-2017, High-Speed Rail accidents). 
 
6.4.2 Strength and Strength Distribution 
Through weighting (adding consideration to the network edge and the severity of the 
accident), the weighted network is obtained as shown in Figure 6.24. The most important 
point in the network (top 10%) is EM26 (Train delayed), M05 (Not sufficient inspection 
and Supervision), H04 (Driver’s operation mistake) 
In the equipment category, the strength value of EM34 (Train passed red signal) 
exceeds EM05 (Train minor damaged) after weighting, showing that line safety is more 
important for the safety of High-Speed Rail than line safety. 
Among human factors, H06 (Rail line inspector did not check out problems in time) 
surpassed H20 (Staff left machine/goods/material on the track), becoming the third most 
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Among management factors, the most important factor is M05 (Not sufficient 
inspection and supervision), followed by M03 (Weak management), M02 (Inadequate 
safety precautions) and M06 (Weak maintenance system). 
 
Figure 6.24 Strength distribution (2013-2017, High-Speed Rail accidents). 
 
Figure 6.25 illustrates that cumulative node strength distribution of network follows 
an power law as 𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘)~1.4823𝑥𝑥−1.381(𝑅𝑅2 = 0.8193). The top 14.29% factors account for 
a majority (54.29%) of all the times of occurrences, and the most (54.29%) of factors occur 



















































Figure 6.25 Cumulative strength distribution (2013-2017, High-Speed Rail accidents). 
 
6.4.3 Shortest Path and Diameter 
In the High-Speed Rail accident causation network, the average shortest path length is 2.21. 
This means that the causality related to another factor is about two steps in the network. 
The average path of the causality related to the accident is 2.56, which means that about 2-
3 causal factors are needed to cause the accident. The network diameter is 5, from E04 
(Freezing temperatures) to H20 (Staff left machine/goods/material on the track) / 
M02(Inadequate safety precautions) and M02 (Inadequate safety precautions) / M05 (Not 
sufficient inspection and supervision), H20 (Staff left machine/goods/material on the track) 
to C12 (Locomotive broken shaft, key components fall off) are the five furthest pairs of 














0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Cumulative Strength Distribution
(2013-2017, High-Speed Railway Acicdents) 
 
130 
the presence of remnants that affect safety on the rails in five steps or cause insufficient 
safety precautions. Inadequate management and inspection or misplaced items on the rails 
will lead to accident C13 (A collision occurred while the train was running) through the 
transmission of five factors. 
6.4.4 Clustering Coefficient 
Figure 6.26 shows the clustering coefficient in the causation network of the High-Speed 
Rail accident. The clustering coefficient of three of the five nodes reaches 1, and the other 
nodes are also greater than 0.3, showing that these five elements are highly clustered. The 
average aggregation coefficient of the network is as high as 0.73, and the average path of 
the network discussed in the previous paragraph is only 2.21. The combination of the two 
features makes the entire network very consistent with the characteristics of the small world 
network. This means that most factors easily interact with each other and need to be strictly 
controlled to eliminate the "resonance" phenomenon in system operation. 
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6.4.5 Betweenness Centrality 
Compared with the networks in Sections 5.2 and 5.4, the causation network of the High-
Speed Rail is smaller in scale and the path selection for accident development will be less, 
so the Betweenness centrality in the network is higher. The difference is that the highest 
value of Betweenness centrality in High-Speed Rail accidents is M05, which shows that 
daily maintenance and supervision are the key factors in High-Speed Rail accidents. Figure 
6.27 describes a possible accident development chain: inadequate maintenance (M05) 
caused train delays (EM26), and railway line hazards (EM07) caused by employees leaving 
items on the rails (H20). 
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6.5 Comparison between Regular and High-Speed Rail Accident 
This part is a comparison of the causes of accidents between regular railways and High-
Speed Rail. Two network characteristics are used for comparison: node strength and 
betweenness centrality, all data comes from the previous chapters. 
6.5.1 Overview  
Strength is a measure of the frequency of node connections. Compared with the degree, it 
can better reflect the importance of nodes in the network. This also means that the intensity 
represents the influence of the incident on the accident. For each type of accident, three 
types of accident causal factors were selected: equipment and machinery, human factors, 
and management factors. The total strength of these three factors in the network is 84.52% 
(regular) and 82.06% (High-Speed Rail). The two types of factors that are not discussed 
here are the environment and the type of accident. The impact on the development of the 
accident is very small and can be ignored. 
According to the comparison of categories, the proportion of High-Speed Rail 
equipment is 2.12% higher than that of general railway, the gap is very small, but the total 
proportion of management elements is lower than that of regular railway 4.38%. A 
reasonable explanation is that the use of automated systems, such as train control systems, 





6.5.2 Equipment Factors 
 
The table above (Table 6.3) lists the top five equipment factors in the High-speed Railroad 
and regular railroad accident network. The comparison found that the top five factors in 
the High-Speed Rail network accounted for 29.07% of the total, much higher than the 
regular railway's 17.12%. Shows a high concentration of equipment risk. Among them, the 
EM26 ranking rose to first, and the proportion has also increased significantly, showing 
the importance of High-Speed Rail for train delays for High-Speed Rail accidents. In the 
High-Speed Rail network, due to the application of the automatic driving control system, 
the minimum driving interval is 3 minutes (the design value of the CTCS-3 system, the 
minimum interval in practical application is 4 minutes, see the Beijing-Shanghai High-
Speed Rail), while the regular line train interval For 7 minutes (CTCS-0 / 1 system), any 
delay of trains longer than three minutes is a huge security threat to the High-Speed Rail 
network. 
Table 6.3 Equipment & Machine Node Strength Comparison Between High-speed Rail 
and Regular Railroad Accident 
Rank Percentage of node strength (Equipment & machine) 
 
Regular High-Speed Rail 
1 EM05 19.6 5.02% EM26 8.2 7.54% 
2 EM26 19.2 4.92% EM07 6.6 6.07% 
3 EM25 10.8 2.77% EM05 6.4 5.89% 
4 EM34 8.8 2.26% EM34 6.4 5.89% 









The proportions of EM07 (risk of the line), EM34 (Train passed red line) and EM43 
(infrastructure damaged) are significantly higher than those of regular railway, showing 
the high dependence of High-Speed Rail on infrastructure and signal system. As a complex 
technical system, High-Speed Rail highly depends on the cooperation of various parts of 
the system. Infrastructure, power system, signal system, train control system, and 
communication system are all important functional parts, which are crucial to the safety of 
High-Speed Rail. 
6.5.3 Human Factor 
Table 6.4 Human Factors Comparison Between High-speed Rail and Regular Railroad 
Accident 
Rank Percentage of node strength (Human Factor) 
 
Regular High-Speed Rail 
1 H08 20.8 5.33% H04 7.5 6.90% 
2 H03 17.3 4.43% H08 7.4 6.81% 
3 H20 14.9 3.82% H06 6.4 5.89% 
4 H06 13.8 3.54% H20 4.2 3.86% 








Human factors and equipment show a similar pattern, and the top five High-Speed Rail are 
more concentrated. The biggest change is H04 (driver make mistake), which accounts for 
3.38% more than regular railway. It shows that the wrong operation of the driver has the 
greatest threat to the safety of the High-Speed Rail, or that the professional level of the 
driver cannot fully meet the requirements of the High-Speed Rail. Factors that vary greatly 
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in human factors are H06 (Rail line inspector did not check out problems in time) and H08 
(Track worker ’s negligence), which involves maintenance staff not meeting maintenance 
requirements. In general, human factors have the same impact on High-Speed Rail as 
regular railways, but the impact is more concentrated on each factor. 
6.5.4 Management  
The management factor data proves that there is no obvious defect in the management 
system and policies of High-Speed Rail. Compared with regular railways, the impact of 
overall management factors on safety is decreasing. The only increasement in M05 (Not 
sufficient inspection and supervision) can be regarded as the personal negligence of 
managers: the constraints (regulations) for protecting safety exist because the factors of 
arena do not play a role in safety management. 
Table 6.5 Management Factors Comparison Between High-speed Rail and Regular 
Railroad Accident 
Rank Percentage of node strength (Management) 
  Regular High-Speed Rail 
1 M05 19.2 4.92% M05 7.6 6.99% 
2 M02 16 4.10% M03 2.2 2.02% 
3 M03 15 3.85% M02 2.1 1.93% 
4 M01 10 2.56% M06 1 0.92% 
5 M06 3.2 0.82%       
Summary 16.25%   11.87% 




6.5.5 Regular Railroad Accidents 
Observing the safety status of regular railway from another angle, the strength values of 
equipment factors are evenly dispersed in each equipment factor, showing that the overall 
safety level is low. The requirements for safety management are higher, because there is 
no key part to strengthen attention. This can be confirmed by the distribution of the value 
of betweenness centrality. Table 6.6 shows the top ten elements of the value of betweenness 
centrality among High-Speed Rail and regular railways. The highest value of betweenness 
centrality of High-Speed Rail is 0.388, while that part of regular railway is only 0.253. The 
value of clustering coefficient also shows the same characteristics: the clustering 
coefficient of the High-Speed Rail network is 0.7333, and the regular railway is only 
0.3562. It shows that the causation network elements of the High-Speed Rail are more 
concentrated, while the causation network structure of the regular railway is more scattered. 
Table 6.6 Betweenness Centrality (High- Speed Rail and Regular Rail)  
Rank Betweenness Centrality 
HSR Regular 
1 M05 0.389 EM26 0.253 
2 EM26 0.379 H04 0.252 
3 H20 0.262 H03 0.154 
4 EM07 0.246 H06 0.130 
5 H04 0.210 H08 0.111 
6 EM05 0.179 M05 0.111 
7 H08 0.153 EM05 0.099 
8 EM34 0.129 EM29 0.092 







The previous network analysis has provided an overall description of the causes of different 
types of railway accidents. The following themes are aimed at analyzing the main problems 
found in network analysis. By combining specific cases, or comparing with the successful 
experience of other industries or countries, it is expected that strategic recommendations 




In the network analysis in the last chapter, human factors show its great importance in 
High-Speed Rail accidents. Three of the top five High-Speed Rail accidents are caused by 
human factors (including management), and the proportion exceeds the equipment factor. 
These three factors are M05, not sufficient inspection and supervision, 6.99%) H04 
(driver's operation mistake, 6.90%) and H08 (track worker's negligence, 6.81%). 
Moreover, betweenness' centrality value is also very high, ranking respectively the 1st, 5th 
and 3rd places of causation network. This means that by controlling these three factors, the 
loss of accidents on High-Speed Rail can be reduced by at least 20%. 
7.1.1 Lion Ocean Tunnel Accident  
The problem of weak human factors has been a symptom since the early stages of High-
Speed Rail construction. In the 7.23 Wenzhou train collision accident that occurred in 
2011, the illegal operation of maintenance staff and the negligence of the drivers of the 
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accident EMU under abnormal operating conditions are the reasons for the accident. This 
situation continued at least until the “lion ocean tunnel accident” happened. At the 
beginning of 2018, a High-Speed Rail accident occurred within the jurisdiction of 
Guangzhou Railway Group. The direct cause of the accident was equipment failure of the 
power system. However, a large number of personnel factors have been exposed in 
emergency response such as maintenance and rescue after the accident. 
Table 7.1 shows a record of an accident. (Liu, 2020) Accident happened on March 
5, 2018, around 7 AM, a northbound High-Speed Rail train from Shenzhen to Guangzhou 
was stuck in the Lion Ocean tunnel when the power supply was cut off unexpectedly. 
According to the Accident Log, the catenary wire fell off and broken and/or damaged many 
pantographs and other equipment from the affected train. All High-Speed Rail trains along 
the Shen-Guang line are composed of Electric Multiple Units (EMU). With the power 
failure occurred in the tunnel, the entire segment of High-Speed Rail line is out of service, 
including the trains operating in the opposite direction. After emergency repairs, the line 








Accident occurred in a tunnel near the sea. A short circuit caused by a 
failure of equipment that supplies power to the train and at the same time 
damage to the equipment on the roof of the affected vehicle; 
1 min The entire line stops running due to loss of power; 
3 mins All railway network informed; 
10 mins The maintenance technicians from the affected train inspected the vehicle and overhead wire; 
20 mins Reported pantograph damaged on affected train;  
 A rescue train was arranged by the control center; 
55 mins Affected train request for rescue; 
1 hour 15 mins The rescue train departed; 
1 hour 30 mins The first maintenance team arrived; 
1 hour 40 mins The maintenance team reported that the accident was more serious than previously understood. The first repair plan developed; 
1 hour 50 mins The second maintenance team arrived; 
1 hour 55 mins Maintenance team expected repair would be finished after 60 minutes; 
2 hours 30 mins The maintenance team applied to board the train roof for repairs; 
2 hours 35 mins Rescue train stopped at the nearby station; 
2 hours 50 mins The maintenance team began to climb the train roof for repairs; 
3 hours 35 mins The first repair plan failed as damages exceeded expectations; The second repair plan developed; repair time unpredictable; 
3 hours 40 mins The control center arranged passenger train to transfer passengers from affected train; 
4 hours 10 mins The second repair plan failed due to improper repair equipment.  The third repair plan developed; 
4 hours 15 mins The rescue train started again; 
4 hours 45 mins The passenger transferring train departure for the scene; 
5 hours 15 mins The passenger transferring train arrived at the scene; 
5 hours 20 mins The rescue train arrived; 
5 hours 30 mins The third repair plan failed due to inappropriate repair process. The fourth repair plan developed; 
6 hours 15 mins Passenger transfer finished; 
6 hours 25 mins Transfer train arrived station nearby; 
7 hours 10 mins The rescue train leaving with accident train; 
7 hours 20 mins The team completed the repair and started to supply power; 
7 hours 50 mins The first train passed the accident section at a lower speed; 
D Day Night The repairs to the damaged equipment and facilities continued; 
D+1 Day Night Repair finished; the line resumed normal operation. 




The maintenance technology and judgment of the on-board engineer exposed by 
the accident were not qualified. Even the emergency maintenance team, which was 
supposed to be the best engineering staff, failed to complete the maintenance task in time. 
The impact of the accident lasted until midnight the next day, and the line was restored to 
the state before the accident almost 48 hours later. 
7.1.2 Operating Pressure 
The human factor problem is caused by two reasons. First, the fast-growing High-Speed 
Rail network. The chart lists the procurement of new High-Speed Rail lines and vehicles 
from 2013 to 2017. Within five years, China has newly opened High-Speed Rail lines of 
3,000 kilometers and purchased up to 1,300 High-Speed Rail EMUs (as shown in Figure 
7.1 and Figure 7.2), each The EMU consists of 8 or 16 cars. EMUs purchased within three 
years have almost doubled the number of EMUs in China. This kind of complicated and 
sophisticated equipment purchased in a large amount of time is a huge challenge for drivers 
and maintenance. This directly aggravates the work intensity of the existing staff, and also 
causes a shortage of maintenance and operation staff. According to estimates by railway 





Figure 7.1 Length of High-Speed Rail in Guangzhou Railway Group. 
Source: Guangdong Railway Group, 2015-2019. 
 
 
Figure 7.2  New purchase EMUs in China (2013-2017). 
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7.1.3 Absence of Internal Training System 
In the management system of China's High-Speed Rail, training has not received the 
attention it deserves. In the structure of China Railway Corporation, there is no department 
responsible for staff training. The existing staff department is only responsible for the 
recruitment of management staff of the head office. In regional companies, the training 
situation has also undergone major changes: Since 2004, the training institutions under the 
Guangzhou Railway Group have been reformed in a market-oriented manner. The internal 
training institutions of the railway system managed by the former Ministry of Railways 
have been transformed into part of the national public education system. After the reform, 
2,500 students graduated from an educational institution named "Guangzhou Railway 
Vocational and Technical College" at 2017. 40% of the 200 people leave the transportation 
industry, and another 60% of the trained staff are employed by more than ten subway 
companies in the Pearl River Delta region and railway companies in Hong Kong and 
Hainan. In 2015-2019, Guangzhou Railway Group recruited more than 2,000 people, and 
even more than 4,000 people at its peak. Most of them were college-level technical staff. 
(as shows in Figure 7. 3) Which does not include graduates who have signed a work 
contract for training in the above institutions since the start of school. There is a huge gap 
between the demand for technical staff and the graduates of professional training 
institutions. In order to supplement the redundancy of employees, Guangzhou Railway 
Group had to recruit people from the society. Although the number can meet the 
requirements, due to the lack of training of professional institutions, the staff will not be 
qualified for professional technical positions in the short term. After losing its own local 
training school, the daily training of all railway employees of Guangzhou Railway Group 
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was organized by the national management agency "China Railway Corporation", but the 
efficiency and scale of the training decreased compared with before. The gap between 
training capacity and business needs should be planned for a long time to ensure that high-
quality employees will greatly improve railway safety. 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Recruitment in Guangzhou Railway Group (2015-2019). 
Resource: Guangdong Railway Group, 2015-2019. 
 
The negative impact of the absence of training institutions on employee quality is 
reflected in two aspects: qualification training and continue training. As one of 18 regional 
companies, Guangzhou Railway Company has about 147,000 employees and about 3,000-
5,000 new employees each year. It is inferred that the annual recruitment of new employees 
of the national railway is about 41,600-69,300. Consider the difference between academic 
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employees have the professional skills to engage in the railway industry, so the professional 
qualification training for new employees is a necessary part of ensuring the quality of 
employees. In the existing Chinese railway management system, the only professional 
training institution is located in Wuhan, Hubei Province, established in September 2014. 
The annual training capacity is 14,000. Compared with the total number of employees in 
the railway system of 2.04 million, this training capability is far from meeting the needs of 
employee training. At the same time, the technical system of High-Speed Rail is still 
evolving, the technology transfer phase is gradually ending, the proportion of localization 
is increasing, and the technology is constantly maturing. At the same time, new equipment 
(such as new traction power supply technology and new EMU vehicles) is continuously 
put into use. This requires that employees should be continuously trained to adapt their 
vocational skills to changing needs. And regional companies, such as Guangzhou Railway 
Company, have lost their own training institutions. The only training institutions in the 
country have very limited capacity. Therefore, the continuing education of employees 
cannot be guaranteed. 
7.1.4 External Experience 
Positive cases from the aviation industry may have inspired railway operators and policy 
makers. FAA statistics show that human causes account for 80% of accidents in the 
aviation industry. The aviation accident rate in China decreased from 5.42 per million flight 
hours between 1980 and 1985 to 0.19 per million flight hours between 2000 and 2005, and 
there was no flight accident for three consecutive years from 2005 to 2007. During this 
period, China established the Civil Aviation Safety Academy of China, a training 
institution dedicated to safety training. In addition, the Civil Aviation Administration of 
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China also invested 250 million (RMB) to establish flight training centers in major airlines 
such as Air China, China Eastern Airlines, China Southern Airlines, Hainan Airlines, and 
Civil Aviation University. At the same time, the Civil Aviation Administration actively 
promotes airlines, airports, air traffic control and other agencies to increase investment and 
establish their own training institutions and systems. It is these investments in human 
resources that have successfully improved the safety level of the aviation industry. 
 
7.2 Equipment 
The previous network analysis results show that the proportion of device factors in the 
network exceeds 40%. Especially in the causation network of High-Speed Rail, the out-
degree ratio of equipment factors has reached 43.75%, indicating that equipment factors in 




7.2.1 Immature Technology  
 
Figure 7.4 General Hype Cycle for technology. 
Source: Gartner, 2019. 
 
The hype cycle is a product cycle proposed by the business consulting company Gartner 
(Tarkovskiy., 2020), which describes the expected value change of a new technology at 
different stages. Although many critics point out that this model lacks data support, it still 
provides a way to describe technical products. As shown in Figure 7.4, new technologies 
are always expected to be high in the early stages of development and touted by the market. 
When the failure or performance of a technical product fails to meet market expectations, 
the attention and capital investment received by the product will decrease until the new 
technology gradually matures and is recognized by the people and the market. Observe the 
development of High-Speed Rail in China from the perspective of product maturity, the 
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High-Speed Rail experienced exactly this period of adaptation, development stage, many 
failures, and unstable performance, indicating the immaturity of the product.  
7.2.2 Incomplete Transfer 
According to widely accepted views, the development of High-Speed Rail technology in 
China is actually a government-led technology transfer. From 2004 to 2005, the first time 
China introduced High-Speed Rail technology from three countries to the period of this 
study (2013-2017), only ten years have passed. For China, the High-Speed Rail is a brand 
new, complex, and the fastest transportation vehicle ever on the ground. No matter how 
fast and how large this system is. Ten years is not enough to fully master such a brand-new 
technical product. As shown in the Table 7.2, although China announced in 2010 that it has 
successfully developed a new generation of EMU-CRH380 with independent intellectual 
property rights. But in fact, this model is still based on the imported model. Some key 
technologies in vehicles, such as bogies and train control systems, are still imported from 
abroad. To some extent, the EMU technology of this period is still a collection of 
multinational technologies and products in China. Until seven years after CRH380 was in 
operation, China once again declared that the fully-developed standard EMU "Fuxing" was 
officially put into operation. The High-Speed Rail technology transfer was not really 





Table 7.2 Second Generation High-Speed Rail Models and Their Key Features 
Series CRH380A CRH380B CRH380C CRH380D 
Advanced Model CRH380A CRH380AL CRH380B CRH380BL CRH380 CL   
Manufactory CSR Qingdao Sifang CNR Changchun CNR Changchun BST 
Original model CRH2C Phase2 CRH3 CRH3C & CRH380BL ZEFIRO 380 
Manufactured time 2010-1011 2010-2013 2012 2010-2013 2011-2013 2012-2014 
Running time 2010.9.30 2011.6.30 2012.10.9 2011.1.13 2011 2013 
Format 6M2T 14M2T 4M4T 8M8T 8M8T 4M4T 
Capacity 480 1028/1061 450 1043 1053   
Power 9600kW 20440kW 9600kW 18400kW 19200kW   
Speed 350/380 km/h 350/380 km/h 350/380 km/h 350/380 km/h 
Running count 41 95 41 102 25 70 
Source: Liu and Lv, 2014. 
 
7.2.3 Radical Development Plan 
The policy did not match the development of the High-Speed Rail well. On the contrary, 
the aggressive policy amplified the potential safety hazards of the equipment. 
At a time when the product was not mature enough, China did not adopt a reliable 
small-scale experimental operation to discover equipment and operational vulnerabilities. 
Instead, it was built quickly under the direction of a strong manager. The Table 7.3 shows 
the main points of China's long-term railway development plan. It can be said that policy 
makers launched railway development plans in 2004, 2008 and 2016 respectively. The 
target time points of the three plans are all in 2020, but the planning targets of the railways 
change greatly. The planned railway scale is getting bigger and bigger. The average annual 
construction length is gradually increasing. According to the 2004 plan, an average of 400 
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kilometers of High-Speed Rail are constructed each year, and according to the revised plan 
in 2008, this number has increased to 1,200 kilometers, and it has doubled in 2016, almost 
four times the 2004 plan.  
Table 7.3 Railway Network Planning For 2020 In Different Years 
Plan Year 2004 Plan 
2004 Plan  
(2008 Revision) 
2016 Plan 




3 metropolitan areas 
Beijing; Shanghai; 
Guangzhou 




Wuhan, Xi'an, Xiamen 
All City with 
population over 
0.5M 
Network Length(km) 100000 120000 150000 
High-Speed Rail 
Length(km) 12000 16000 30000 
Current Length 
(Network) 75000 86000 19000 
Current Length 
(High-Speed Rail) 
405 1396 121000 
Source: State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2004, 2008, 2016. 
 
Bold is not just a plan, the Figure 7.5 shows the progress of the construction every 
year, you can see the "Chinese speed" in the construction of High-Speed Rail. As 
mentioned in the previous section, 1600 high-speed trains were added in three years, and 
the tracks of High-Speed Rail were extended by 10,000 kilometers. Excessive pursuit of 
construction speed compresses the development and testing time of various supporting 
products, which in turn causes hidden safety hazards. There have been examples of 
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accidents caused by tight construction schedules. The official 7.23 accident investigation 
report believes that the main reason for the accident is the serious design flaws in the train 
control equipment. The investigation team believes that the management department (the 
Ministry of Railways at that time) "rushed the schedule and progress in the railway 
construction and unilaterally pursued the construction speed of the project. Insufficient 
attention to security ". The technical department of the Ministry of Railways, which is 
responsible for the review of train control equipment, did not comply with the 
specifications when reviewing the equipment. In the case of "urgent line construction 
schedule requirements, urged by relevant departments", the equipment was irregularly 
reviewed. These factors caused the non-compliant design and installation of train control 
equipment, resulting in the 7.23 accident. 
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CHINA HSR Construction Progress 
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Yearly Completed Cumulative length
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7.2.4 Imperfect Maintenance 
Poor maintenance of equipment is another important factor that affects equipment safety. 
Part of the problem comes from the maintenance staff, which has been discussed before. 
The important changes in the maintenance policy during this period also caused potential 
safety hazards to the equipment. 
Lu Chunfang, as the deputy director of the Ministry of Railways of China, 
introduces the maintenance system of the China EMU, which is divided into five levels of 
maintenance according to the running time or running journey. The specific requirements 
are as follows table.  
 
Table 7.4 High-speed Rail Maintain System in CHINA  
China EMU Maintenance Classes 
Level Condition 
Ⅰ Every running 4000km or 48 hours 
Ⅱ Monthly Maintenance 
Ⅲ Running 0.6 million km or 1.5 years 
Ⅳ Running 1.2 million km or 3 years 
Ⅴ Running 2.4 million km or 6 years 
Source: Lu, 2015. 
 
The maintenance cost of a series of EMUs (8-car group) is 15 million RMB per 
year, accounting for 10% of the purchase price of EMUs. The annual maintenance cost of 
EMUs trains in the entire system is 39 billion RMB, while the total liabilities of China 
Railway Corporation in 2016 were 4.3 trillion RMB, and the corporate debt ratio was 64%. 
Due to the pressure of operating costs, China Railway Corporation has extended the high-
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level repair cycle interval of EMUs from 600,000 kilometers to 1.2 million kilometers in 
2015, while compressing the maintenance time of various levels by 30% -40%. The 
operation time of routine rapid maintenance (level 1 maintenance) is required to be 
controlled within 2 hours, and the maintenance content has also been reduced. In addition, 
not only the maintenance policy of EMU, the maintenance frequency of ordinary passenger 
cars and trucks has been reduced by 10% -30%. The maintenance location is also changing 
from the manufacturer to the maintenance department of the railway system. The 
maintenance location of EMUs used to be at the manufacturer, and now the Railway Group 
Corporation is constructing multiple facilities nationwide for maintenance. The relocation 
of maintenance sites brings financial benefits, but for railway systems with weaker 
maintenance capabilities than manufacturers, the maintenance and repair pressure of more 
than 2,600 EMUs, 50,000 ordinary passenger cars, and 900,000 trucks is definitely a 
challenge. 
Another hidden danger of maintenance lies in maintenance technology. The 
aforementioned Lion Ocean Tunnel accident exposed the threat of equipment maintenance 
by maintenance technology. The cause of the accident was the accelerated aging of the 
High-Speed Rail power source "catenary" in the high-salt environment in the coastal 
tunnel. The accident train damaged catenary when passing the line and lost power. 
Catenary's maintenance and daily inspection found no problems. In the daily operation of 
China's High-Speed Rail, there is a "no-load inspection vehicle run" before the revenue 
trains running. The problem is that this kind of routine maintenance is done at low speed 
through the railway line. This kind of train operation itself will use line equipment, which 
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creates a paradox: Is there any way to check and maintain the line after the maintenance 
vehicle passes? 
7.2.5 Social Factors 
In addition to the natural environment, social factors are also important factors affecting 
the safety of High-Speed Rail equipment. As more and more cities are connected by High-
Speed Rail, the length of inevitable lines built in urban areas is also increasing. The 
complexity of the urban environment and the impact of human activities have also affected 
the safety of High-Speed Rail. The most fragile part of the High-Speed Rail is its power 
system. The catenary is composed of electrical components and has a complex structure 
that must be exposed to the air. It is easily affected by the activities of urban residents. 
Within two days in 2017, February 20 and 21, the High-Speed Rail in the Zhengzhou area 
had 16 incidents caused by light objects hanging on the catenary, causing a total of seven 






CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This chapter summarizes the results of this research, including theoretical contributions, 
railway (High-Speed Rail) safety features and strategic recommendations. In the future 
research, the methodology and scope of research will be discussed. 
 
8.1 Conclusion 
8.1.1 Railway & High-Speed Rail Safety 
Data analysis shows that the annual change of railway accidents (including High-Speed 
Rail) is obvious, and it is mainly affected by equipment reliability and staff factors. The 
main accident causes of High-Speed Rail and general railways have no significant 
differences in categories, with equipment factors accounting for approximately 40% and 
human factors accounting for approximately 30%. However, there are obvious differences 
in specific accident factors. The main reasons include negligence of staff (including drivers 
and maintenance staff), and the reliability of the equipment is not high. Compared with 
traditional railway accidents, the impact of Conductor on safety has been greatly weakened, 
but the impact of driver errors has increased, and the frequency of failure to receive timely 
maintenance is also higher than traditional railways. The delay of trains has shown a higher 
impact on the safe operation of High-Speed Rail, while the impact of minor damage has 
declined. Overall, the safety of high-speed trains is more sensitive to the schedule (time), 
the requirements for maintenance are higher, and the requirements for the quality and 
 
155 
maintenance of drivers are higher. It shows the characteristics of the High-Speed Rail as a 
complex advanced technical complex.   
8.1.2 Strategy Recommendation 
1. The frequency of policy changes should be more moderate, including construction 
and procurement plans.  
Chinese policymakers have a preference for eagerly accomplishing some iconic, 
compelling achievements to enhance their reputation and promotion opportunities. 
Meanwhile, building a large amount of infrastructure or purchasing equipment in a short 
period of time will definitely impact the maintenance system and management system. The 
impact includes an increase in failure rate, an increase in safety accidents, and a decline in 
service levels. 
2. Enhance training system and improve staff quality.  
Enhance the company's own training institutions, including the establishment of 
supervisors in the company's management and the establishment of training centers in the 
region and the formation of routine employee training arrangements. The frequency and 
depth of staff training should be increased in daily operations and long-term planning. 
3. Improve data quality 
Both the accuracy and accessibility of accident information need to be improved, 
including improving the content of accident reports and publishing accident information to 
the public. The disclosure of accident information does not spread panic among the public. 
On the contrary, timely and accurate provision of accident information is beneficial to 
improving safety. And timely update of train operation information is an important content 
of customer service. 
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8.1.3 Theoretical Contribution 
First of all, the study verified that the complex network can be applied to the analysis of 
High-Speed Rail accidents. By decomposing High-Speed Rail accidents into event chains, 
a directed network is modeled. Then to use the mathematical characteristics of the network, 
such as degree, strength, average shortest path length and clustering coefficient, to analyze 
the accident, describe the logical relationship between the accident factors, and find out the 
key accident factors. The basic analysis steps of the above complex network models have 
been verified in the High-Speed Rail safety research in this paper, and succeeded. 
Furthermore, the damage degree of the accident is included in the analysis 
framework. The weighted directional network is upgraded to dual-weighted directional 
network, by adding a second weight. This makes the description and analysis of the 
accident by the complex network more comprehensive. 
Additionally, it has been proved during the research that the success of the analysis 
method of complex network systems depends on sufficient data. In the study, some network 
features could not be calculated due to the lack of sufficient data. For example, we tried to 
compare the clustering coefficient of different years, but failed because the data in most 
years was insufficient to support the calculation. 
Last of all, five years of accident cases have added a large number of empirical 
cases to complex network analysis models. Through case analysis, especially the case 
analysis by year, we have a more comprehensive understanding of the limitations of 
complex network models. Complex network models also rely on adequate data support like 
other models. In the case of insufficient data, the mathematical characteristics of complex 
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networks cannot be fully utilized, which will affect the final analysis results. This is proved 
by the analysis of the clustering coefficient in this paper. 
 
8.2 Future Research 
8.2.1 Methodology 
1. Dual-Weighted Method 
The parameters shown in Table 3.1.3 for weighting according to the severity of the 
accident are my assumptions. Whether these values are reasonable requires further study. 
2. Modeling Method.  
The first step of causation network modeling is to extract the cause of the accident. 
The extraction process does not have a unified standard, and it completely depends on the 
researcher's experience and knowledge. How to make the extraction of accident causes 
universally accepted is a potential research topic. 
8.2.2 Research Topic 
1. Extensive research 
This study only selected one of the eighteen regional management agencies in the 
Chinese railway network for analysis. China has the world's largest High-Speed Rail 
network, and great geographical characteristics, economic and cultural characteristics 
diversity of these 18 regions. These all affect the construction and operation of High-Speed 
Rail. It is hoped that the follow-up study can extend the scope of the study to other regions, 
or the nationwide High-Speed Rail system. To make the safety situation of China's High-
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Speed Rail more comprehensively studied, this not only has important academic 
achievements, but also is inestimable for the value of life and economy. 
2. Mining data 
The data of current research is still limited, and some research results are not 
complete. For example, the analysis of clustering coefficient in some years is lack of 





CASUSAL FACTORS (RAIB) 
 
The causal factors in this appendix are extracted from the research results of RAIB railway 
accidents. The factors in the original text include human factors, equipment factors, 
environmental factors, management factors and accident factors. In addition to accident 
factors, the other four types of factors are directly cited in this doctoral dissertation to 
analyze the accident and construct the accident causal network in Chapter 5. 
Table A.1 Human Factors 
Factor Code 
Shunter’s operation Mistake H01 
Driver failed to Apply Emergency brake H02 
Conductor’s Mistake H03 
Driver’s operation Mistake H04 
Track Maintainer’s inadequate Maintenance H05 
Rail line inspector did not check out problems in time H06 
Worker was working in danger conditions H07 
Track worker’s negligence H08 
Passenger fell from platform H09 
Dispatcher’s Mistake H10 
Train driver unable to stop the train H11 
Level crossing watchman’s Mistake H12 
Train Maintainer’s inadequate Maintenance H13 
Pedestrians/car on the line in danger H14 
Train driver drove when tired H15 
Train driver drove Higher than the permitted speed H16 
Signaler’s wrong command H17 
Staff insufficient braked the train H18 
Staff’s negligence H19 
Staff left Machine/goods/material on the track H20 




Table A.2 Equipment and Machine Factors 
Factor Code Factor Code 
Locomotive failure EM01 Train started with door open EM28 
Track damaged EM02 Train braking system failure EM29 
Power supply failure EM03 Container train failure EM30 
Signal displayed false EM04 
Design defect of locomotive 
component EM31 
Train Minor damaged  EM05 A system fault on the set of train door EM32 
Ineffective drainage EM06 Crossing operating failure EM33 
The risk of the line EM07 Train passed red signal EM34 
Train seriously damaged EM08 Ineffective handbrakes on the wagon EM35 
Risk of signal system EM09 Train’s unbraked condition EM36 
Train’s signal system failure EM10 Bridge failure EM37 
The Automatic operation of the 
crossing failure EM11 Control center system failure EM38 
Railway tunnel was unsafe EM12 Overhead line failure EM39 
Wagon failure EM13 Container fell EM40 
Uneven loading of the wagon EM14 Train door detaching EM41 
Track circuit failure EM15 Container door open EM42 
Turnout failure EM16 Infrastructure damaged EM43 
Pantograph fell EM17 Goods Moved out from wagon/train EM44 
Train’s window broken EM18 Design defect of the track EM45 
Railway bed failure EM19 Track gauge out of tolerance EM46 
Train fire EM20 The wagon overloaded EM47 
Electrical failure EM21 Unauthorized train Movement EM48 
Train wheel failure EM22 Draw hook broken EM49 
Collapsing of soil EM23 
Point was operated into wrong 
situation EM50 
Signal Equipment failure EM24 Information transmission failure EM51 
Losing traction power EM25 Hand points Mechanism failure EM52 
Train delayed EM26 Parts of train failure EM53 
Train technical failure EM27     




Table A.3 Weather Factors 
Factor Code 
Rainy condition E01 
Water (flood water) E02 
Wind E03 
Freezing temperatures E04 
Snowy condition E05 
Fallen trees on the line E06 
Fallen big stone E07 
Fallen ice E08 
Fallen rubble E09 
Low Adhesion condition E10 
Fallen concrete debris E11 
Fire E12 
Source: Zhou, 2015.  
 
Table A.4 Management Factors 
Factor Code 
Inadequate safety Education for workers M01 
Inadequate safety precautions M02 
Weak Management M03 
Poor travel Management and Emergency handling M04 
Not sufficient inspection and supervision M05 
Weak Maintenance system M06 






CHINA GENERAL ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION (2007) 
 
The accident classification in this appendix is the source of the accident type code in 
Chapter 5. The following content is excerpted from "Railway traffic accident investigation 
and handling rules": 
 
Article 12. In the case of one of the following circumstances, if it does not constitute a 
major accident, it is a general Class A accident: 
A1. Two people were killed. 
A2. Serious injuries of 5 or more and 10 or less. 
A3. Cause direct economic losses of more than 5 million yuan and less than 10 million 
yuan. 
A4. Conflicts, derailments, fires, explosions, and collisions in trains and shunting 
operations, resulting in one of the following consequences: 
A4.1 One line of busy trunk line or single line train is interrupted for 3 hours or more and 
6 hours or less, and the double line train is interrupted for 2 hours or more and 6 hours or 
less. 
A4.2 One line of other lines or single line breaks for more than 6 hours and 10 hours, and 
the double line train is interrupted for 3 hours or more and 10 hours or less. 
A4.3 Passenger trains are delayed for more than 4 hours. 
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A4.4 Passenger train derailed 1 vehicle. 
A4.5 passenger train picks up more than 2 vehicles in the middle. 
A4.6 passenger car scrapped 1 vehicle or broke more than 2 vehicles. 
A4.7 locomotive broke more than one. 
A4.8 More than one vehicle was broken in the EMU. 
A4.9 freight train derailed more than 4 vehicles and less than 6 vehicles. 
 
Article 13. In the case of one of the following circumstances, if it does not constitute a 
general Class A accident, it is a general Class B accident: 
B1. Caused one death. 
B2. Serious injury to 5 people or less. 
B3. Direct economic losses of more than 1 million yuan and 5 million yuan. 
B4. Conflicts, derailments, fires, explosions, and collisions in trains and shunting 
operations, resulting in one of the following consequences: 
B4.1 The busy trunk line was interrupted for more than 1 hour. 
B4.2 Other lines are interrupted for more than 2 hours. 
B4.3 Passenger trains are delayed for more than one hour. 
B4.4 Passenger train picks up one vehicle in the middle. 
B4.5 passenger car broke 1 vehicle. 
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B4.6 locomotives broke. 
B4.7 freight train derailed more than 2 vehicles and less than 4 vehicles. 
 
Article 14 In the case of one of the following circumstances, if it does not constitute a 
general Class B accident, it is a general Class C accident: 
C1. Train conflict. 
C2. Freight train derailment. 
C3. Train fires. 
C4. Train explosion. 
C5. The train collided. 
C6. Issue the train to the occupied area. 
C7. Connect to the train to the occupied line. 
C8. Not ready to connect and send trains. 
C9. Unsuccessful or wrongly occluded to send trains. 
C10. The train rushes into the signal or crosses the police. 
C11. The rolling stock slips into the section or station. 
C12. The locomotive and vehicle in the train are broken, the wheels are cracked, and the 
brake beam, the pull-down lever, the crossbar and other components fall off. 
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C13. Collision of light vehicles, trolleys, construction machinery, machinery, protective 
fences and other equipment and facilities, or road materials, carcasses, falling rocks. 
C14. Contact wire contact wire is broken, rebared or collapsed. 
C15. Close the angled plug door to release the train or close the angled plug door during 
operation. 
C16. Damage to driving equipment during train operation. 
C17. During the operation of the train, the equipment and facilities, loading of goods 
(including bag, mail), loading of reinforcement materials (or equipment) exceed the limit 
(including exceeding the approved size of the telegraph by the over-limit cargo) or falling. 
C18. Vehicles loaded with over-contained goods are classified into trains by vehicles 
carrying regular cargo. 
C19. Electric locomotives and EMUs are electrified to enter the power outage area. 
C20. Error supply power to the catenary of the power outage section. 
C21. The electrified section climbs the roof and delays the train. 
C22. Passenger train separation. 
C23. Locomotive vehicles that have collided or derailed are not inspected and certified into 
trains. 




C25. Missing, wrong, leaking, misdirected dispatch commands cause the train to run at 
over speed. 
 
Article 15 In the case of one of the following circumstances, if it does not constitute a 
general Class C accident, it is a general Class D accident: 
D1. Shunting conflict. 
D2. Shutdown and derailment. 
D3. Squeeze turnout 
D4. Shutdown and collision. 
D5. Wrong or not timely signal to cause the train to stop. 
D6. Wrong driving certificate or departure train. 
D7. The shunting operation touches the derailer, the protection signal, or the unprotected 
signal. 
D8. Freight train separation. 
D9. Construction, overhaul, and cleaning equipment delay trains. 
D10. The operator violates labor discipline and work discipline to delay the train. 
D11. Abuse of the emergency brake valve to delay the train. 
D12. Unauthorized departure, driving, parking, wrong passage or passing in the interval. 
D13. Train pull iron shoes to drive. 
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D14. Missing, wrong, leaking, misdirected dispatching commands delay trains. 
D15. Mishandling, using the driving equipment to delay the train. 
D16. Use light vehicles, trolleys and construction machinery to delay trains. 
D17. The train tail device shall be installed and the train shall not be installed. 
D18. The train and mail loading and unloading operations delay the train. 
D19. Electric locomotives and EMUs enter the contactless network line incorrectly. 
D20. Workers on the train throwing objects outside to cause personal injury or equipment 
damage. 
D21. The failure of the driving equipment is delayed by more than one hour for the 
passenger trains in this column, or the freight trains of this train are delayed for more than 
2 hours; the delay of fixed equipment affects the normal driving for more than 2 hours 
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